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REVIVING JACOB AND YOUNGS, INC. v. KENT: MATERIAL
BREACH DOCTRINE RECONSIDERED
AMY B.

1.

COHEN*

INTRODUCTION

" ATHEN parties enter into a contract, they come with hopes and

V V fears.

Their hopes are that the contract will go smoothly: that
they will be able to perform exactly as they promised and that the
other party will be able to perform as it promised. On the other
hand, most people who enter into contracts are realistic enough
also to have fears. They fear that they have failed to plan properly
or that some event will occur that will prevent them from perform
ing properly. They also fear that the other party will face some ob
stacle or for reasons of bad faith fail to perform as promised. l

* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. BA. 1974,
Connecticut College; J.D. 1978, Harvard Law School. I wish to thank my col
league, Francis J. Mootz, III, for his assistance and suggestions during the prepara
tion of this Article. In addition, I would like to express my appreciation to Western
New England College School of Law for supporting this project with a research
grant. As always, I am grateful to my husband, Harvey M. Shrage, for his help in
everything I do.
1. See Steven J. Burton & Eric G. Andersen, The World of a Contract, 75 IOWA L.
REv. 861, 865 (1990) (discussing expectation interest). Professors Burton and An
dersen describe contract formation stating:
At the formation of an enforceable contract, the parties typically expect
themselves and their contract partners to do what they promised to do.
When that expectation is reasonable, because grounded-in the world of
the contract, it provides a good reason for a party to change position in
advance of performance by action or inaction. The expectation, how
ever, may be disappointed for a variety of familiar reasons, including mis
takes, misunderstandings, changed circumstances, and misplaced trust.
Id.; see also Arthur I. Rosett, Contract Performance: Promises, Conditions and the Obliga
tion to Communicate, 22 UCLA L. REv. 1083, 1087 (1975) (discussing basic contract
structure). The contract demands that each party do what he or she promised. Id.
Breach results when one party fails to do what he or she promised thereby negat
ing the expectations of the nonbreaching party. Id. The consequence is that the
breaching party may be required to pay money damages to provide the nonbreach
ing party with the financial equivalent of performance. Id. Therefore, the expec
tation interest "defines the harm that is the distinctive ... concern of contract."
Burton & Andersen, supra, at 865. Accordingly, the prime goal of judicial reme
dies for breach of contract is to compensate for harm to this expectation interest.
Id.
See, e.g., L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: 1,46 YALE LJ. 52, 57 (1936) (discussing legal protection of expectation
interest). A breach by one party causes a sense of injury in the other party. Id.
This feeling of injury is not limited, however, to cases where the promisee has
relied on the promise. Id. "Whether or not he has actually changed his position
because of the promise, the promisee has formed an attitude of expectancy such that
(65)
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In making the agreement that will govern their performance,
parties may draft clauses to address these fears, such as escape
clauses that will excuse the party from performing in the event of a
particular contingency or clauses conditioning one party's obliga
tion on the other party's performance. 2 In many instances, how
ever, the parties may not be so particular; some contracts, after all,
are very informal, even unwritten. Even where the parties draft a
formal contract, they may be unwilling or unable to plan for every
fear, every obstacle. 3 Whether the parties have planned for it spe
cifically or not, when something goes wrong, the parties' hopes are
dashed and the agreement, no matter how carefully planned, is
often an inadequate tool for handling the parties' problems. 4
What is the proper role of the law in such instances? How
should such disputes be resolved and how should the legal system
accomplish that resolution? In particular, how should the law re
spond when one party fails to perform as it promised based on its
a breach of the promise causes him to feel that he has been 'deprived' of some
thing which was ·his ...· Id. (emphasis added).
2. See Burton & Andersen, sUfrra note 1, at 872 (discussing express condi
tions). Certain contract terms have the effect of making certain rights or remedies
contingent on an event or condition. Id. For instance, parties to a contract can
make the contract's enforcement a contingent part of their bargain. Id. They may
agree that certain acts or omissions by one party will enable the other party to
cancel the agreement. Id. In addition, they may also agree that certain specified
behavior will result in specific consequences. Id. These terms represent or create
conditions. Id. at n.42; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (1979)
(defining condition as "an event, not certain to occur, which must occur, unless its
non-occurrence is excused, before performance under a contract becomes due").
3. See Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68
CORNELL L. REv. 617, 627 (1983) [hereinafter Hillman, Analysis of Cessation] ("Con
tracting parties may fail to consider and plan for contingencies that will arise be
cause of the limitations of the human mind and imagination in anticipating the
future ...."); see also Rosett, sUfrra note 1, at 1084 ("[The] expectations [of the
parties] are rarely thought through. and inherent limitations on the process of
drafting agreements make it certain they will be incompletely and imperfectly ex
pressed. "). In addition, changes in outside circumstances constantly effect con
tractual relations, "however firmly the parties may appear to be holding to their
original course." Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustments of Long-Term Economic Rela
tions Under Classica~ Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854,
874 (1978). Professors Goetz and Scott, borrowing from Professor Macneil. use
the term "relational contracts" to describe agreements in which "the parties are
incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obliga
tions." Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott. Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L.
REv. 1089, 1090 n.4 (1981).
4. See, e.g.• Hillman, Analysis of Cessation, sUfrra note 3. at 628-29 (discussing
judicial supplementation of freedom of contract). For example, the overall cir
cumstances taken together with the contract terms may not make it clear whether
an agreement is terminable at will or for cause or whether a particular breach
entitles the nonbreacher to cease performance. Id. at 629. In situations such as
these, courts heavily rely on fairness norms. Id.
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belief that the other party has breached its obligation under the
contract? In other words, should the law entitle one party to be
excused from performing simply because the other party has failed
to perform all or part of its obligations under the contract?
Under current common law principles, the answer to the ques
tion is "Yes, sometimes." If the breaching party has committed a
"material breach," then the nonbreaching party is entitled to sus
pend its own performance, and assuming a showing of the breach
ing party's inability to cure in a timely way, the nonbreaching party
can even terminate or cancel the entire contract. 5 If, however, the
breaching party has substantially performed and thus has not mate
rially breached, then the nonbreaching party may not stop perform
ing, but must continue to perform or else find itself exposed to
possible liability for its breach of contract. 6
Determining whether a material breach has occurred under
current law involves a weighing of several factors, a determination
that often seems either completely without logic or precision, or
self-evident and conclusory. Thus, parties are left not knowing what
to do and what risks they may be assuming. The problem with the
current application of material breach doctrine is in large part a
result of an absence of focus. The courts apply the test without
articulating any foundation or context on which it is based. As dis
cussed below, the law in this area could be much improved if courts
would return to Judge Cardozo's opinion in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v.
Kent. 7 In Jacob & Youngs, Judge Cardozo defined the foundation
5. SeeWilJiamj. Geller, Note, The Problem of Withholding in Response to Breach: A
Proposal to Minimize Risk in Continuing Contracts, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 163, 166-67
(1993) (discussing constructive conditions and material breach). When a party
fails to perform substantially the contract when such performance is due, that
party has committed a material breach. Id. at 167. Because the constructive condi
tion of performance has not occurred, the injured party has the right to cancel the
contract and terminate any remaining obligations. Id. But see RESTATEMENT (SEC
OND) OF CONTRACfS § 237 reporter's note, § 242 cmt. a (stating that material
breach merely allows injured party to suspend performance). The approach of the
Second Restatement allows the breaching party to cure the breach until enough
time has passed that cancellation is warranted. Id.; see also 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACfS §§ 8.15, 8.18, at 435, 447 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing
this approach).
6. See Geller, supra note 5, at 168 (discussing substantial performance). When
substantial performance has been rendered and the constructive condition has
been satisfied, the breach of contract is not material. Id. When this occurs, the
nonbreaching party does not have the right to cancel the contract. Id. He or she
may, however, sue for damages for the nonmaterial breach. Id.; see also RESTATE
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 237 cmts. a, d (discussing effect of material and
nonmaterial breach). For a discussion of material breach, see infra notes 35-84
and accompanying text.
7. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
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and the context which can provide courts with the appropriate fo
cus to use in deciding cases of material breach. 8
This Article will thus critique and suggest a modification of ma
terial breach doctrine based largely on Judge Cardozo's reasoning
in Jacob & Youngs Inc. v. Kent. Part II begins with a discussion of
express conditions and then outlines the common law doctrine of
constructive conditions and material breach and demonstrates how
it is intended to apply.9 Part II also describes Judge Cardozo's opin
ion in Jacob & Youngs and how the drafters of the Second Restate
ment of Contracts attempted to incorporate that approach in their
definition of material breach. Io Part III then illustrates how the
courts have failed to use material breach doctrine to address suc
cessfully the problems it is intended to resolve. l l Part IV examines
the writings of some of those who have also studied this area and
critiques the models those scholars have proposed for improving
the law that governs such disputes. I2 Part IV also explores the struc
ture of these disputes and the policy goals the law should be striving
to accomplish once such disputes arise. I3 Part V proposes a change
in the law to accomplish those goals. I4 Finally, Part VI concludes
that a change in the law would promote good faith contract per
formance and independent resolution of contract disputes. I5

8. For a discussion ofJudge Cardozo's opinion inJacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,
see infra notes 3M9.
9. For a further discussion of express conditions, see infra notes 16-27 and
accompanying text. For a further discussion of the common law doctrines of con
structive conditions and material breach, see infra notes 28-35 and accompanying
text.
10. For a further discussion ofJudge Cardozo's opinion inJacob & Youngs and
the Second Restatement's position on material breach, see infra notes 36-55 and
accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion of misapplication of the material breach doctrine,
see infra notes 56-84 and accompanying text.
12. For a further discussion of the critiques and models of constructive condi
tions and material breach by other commentators, see infra notes 85-124 and ac
companying text.
13. For a further discussion of the policy goals behind the doctrines of con
structive conditions and material breach, see infra notes 85-124 and accompanying
text.
14. For a further discussion of this Article's proposal to accomplish the goals
behind constructive conditions and material breach doctrines, see infra notes 12643 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of how to promote good faith contract perform
ance and independent resolution of contract disputes, see infra notes 144-49 and
accompanying text.
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OF CONDITIONS AND BREACH

Express Conditions

As stated above, parties entering into contracts hope that the

intended exchange of performances will go as promised by both
parties. I6 Each party, however, also fears that something will go
wrong. Whether expressed or not, the parties have concerns about
the consequences of the other party's failure to perform. When
those concerns are expressed in the contract between the parties,
the parties assume that the contract terms will govern any problems
that arise. Thus, if the contract provides that an employee's re
peated absences will be grounds for termination, the employer as
sumes that he or she will have a right to terminate the employee if
that employee is repeatedly absent. If a contract provides that a
contractor's delay in construction will result in a termination of the
contract, the owner assumes that he or she will have a right to ter
mination if the contractor fails to perform as promised.
The law generally provides that if express conditions are not
satisfied as provided for in the contract, then the party whose per
formance is so conditioned will be excused from its obligations to
perform.!' As defined in section 224 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts: "[a] condition is an event, not certain to occur, which
must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before perform
ance under a contract becomes due."Is Williston defined the effect
of a condition as follows: "A condition in a promise limits the un
dertaking of the promisor to perform, either by confining the un
dertaking to the case where the condition happens, or to the case
where it does not happen."19 As further provided in section 225 of
16. For a discussion of the parties' "expectation interest," see supra notes 1-4.
17. See Hillman, Analysis of Cessation, supra note 3, at 620 (discussing express
conditions in context of cessation). When parties have clearly assigned the right of
cessation, courts will generally enforce the agreement. [d. By doing so, courts are
holding that "freedom of private parties to order their own affairs maximizes their
welfare, and that of society." [d. (footnote omitted); see also Union Tank Car Co. v.
Lindsay Soft Water Corp., 257 F. Supp. 510 (D. Neb. 1966), aff'd sub nom. Heator
Distrib. Co. v. Union Tank Car Co., 387 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1967) (termination
based on franchisee's failure to satisfy expressly stated minimum sales volume).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (1979).
19. 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 663, at 125
(3d ed. 1961) (footnote omitted). For a discussion of conditions in contract law,
see 3A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 627-631, at 11-22 (1960); 2
FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.2, at 563 (2d ed. 1990). Corbin asserts that there is
no single, correct definition for the term "condition." 3A CORBIN, supra,§ 627, at
11. To avoid misunderstanding and inexact thinking in others, Corbin states that
the word "condition," as used in his work, is defined as "an operative fact, one on
which the existence of some particular legal relation depends." [d.
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the &statement (Second) of Contracts: "[p]erfonnance of a duty sub
ject to a condition cannot become due unless the condition occurs
or its non-occurrence is excused. "20
Thus, if a contract makes an obligation expressly conditional
upon the occurrence of an event, then that obligation will not be
come due if that event does not occur. For example, in Luttinger v.
Rosen,21 the court excused a buyer from its obligation to buy real
property as promised in a contract where the obligation was condi
tioned on the buyer's ability to obtain a bank mortgage for a de
fined tenn of years at a defined interest rate. 22 The buyer was
unable to obtain such bank financing, and even though the seller
agreed to provide essentially equivalent financing, the court al
lowed the buyer to enforce the condition as expressly provided in
its contract and to have its deposit refunded. 23 As the court
observed:
If the condition precedent is not fulfilled the contract is
not enforceable. In this case the language of the contract
is unambiguous and clearly indicates that the parties in
tended that the purchase of defendants' premises be con
ditioned on the obtaining by plaintiffs of a mortgage as
specified in the contract. 24
Thus, failure to satisfy an express condition will relieve the other
party's obligation to perfonn. 25
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225(1); see 3A CORBIN, supra note
19, § 655, at 142 ("If a fact or event is a condition precedent to a promisor's duty
to render the performance promised, its absence or non-occurrence is a 'defense'
in an action brought against him for breach of his promise."); 2 FARNSWORTH,
supra note 5, § 8.3, at 569-74 (discussing effects of nonoccurrence of condition).
21. 316 A.2d 757 (Conn. 1972).
22. [d. at 758.
23. [d.
24. [d. (citations omitted).
25. See Otis Elevator Co. v. George Washington Hotel Corp., 27 F.3d 903, 909
(3d Cir. 1994) (holding party's failure to comply with notice provision to prevent
automatic contract renewal in time required did not satisfy such condition and
resulted in automatic renewal, even though late notice did not prejudice other
party); Brown-Marx Assocs., Ltd. v. Emigrant Sav. Bank, 703 F.2d 1361, 1369 (11th
Cir. 1983) (holding substantial performance of minimal annual rental income
condition to bank financing obligation was insufficient to hold condition satisfied;
strict compliance required of express, as opposed to constructive, conditions);
MXL Indus. v. Mulder, 623 N.E.2d 369, 374-76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (discussing
Strict compliance and substantial performance and holding express condition for
early termination by lessee of lease required strict compliance; substantial perform
ance doctrine held inapplicable); Della Ratta v. American Better Community Dev.,
Inc., 380 A.2d 627, 637-38 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (holding express condition
requiring building permits before contractor is obligated to commence work must
be complied with strictly; substantial performance doctrine not applicable); see also
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In many instances, however, courts will disregard the express
language of the contract and hold that even though a condition has
not been satisfied, its occurrence has been excused and thus, the
other party is not discharged from performing. In finding that the
occurrence of a condition has been excused, the courts rely on sev
eral different doctrines. For example, as discussed in comment b to
section 225 of the Second Restatement:
The non-occurrence of a condition may be excused on a
variety of grounds. It may be excused by a subsequent
promise, even without consideration, to perform the duty
in spite of the non-occurrence of the condition .... It may
be excused by acceptance of performance in spite of the
non-occurrence of the condition, or by rejection following
its non-occurrence accompanied by an inadequate state
ment of reasons. It may be excused by repudiation of the
conditional duty or by a manifestation of an inability to
perform it. It may be excused by prevention or hindrance
of its occurrence through a breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing. And it may be excused by
impracticability.26
Wakefield v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 769 F.2d 109, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding
district court erred in charging jury that substantial performance would satisfy ex
press condition because there must be strict compliance with express condition),
modified, 813 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1987); Renovest Co. v. Hodges Dev. Corp., 600 A.2d
448, 452-53 (N.H. 1991) (involving buyer who failed to comply with deadline for
notifying seller of unsatisfactory inspection report; court applied rule of strict com
pliance of express condition and held buyer to obligations under contract, reason
ing that "when ... parties expressly condition ... upon the occurrence or non
occurrence of an event, rather than simply including the event as one of the gen
eral terms of the contract, the parties' bargained-for expectation of strict compli
ance should be given effect").
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225 cmt. b (1979); see Roberts
Oil Co., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 833 P.2d 222, 226-27 (N.M. 1992) (remand
ing case with instruction that insured's violation of express contractual condition
prohibiting voluntary payments will be excused if insurer is not substantially
prejudiced by violation); Red River Commodities v. Eidsness, 459 N.W.2d 805,80910 (N.D. 1990) (holding failure to comply strictly with express condition requiring
written notice by certified mail of any "act of God" causing shortfall in crop pro
duction excused where party received oral notification of shortfall); if. Hardin,
Rodriguez & Boivin Anesthesiologists, Ltd. v. Paradigm Ins. Co., 962 F.2d 628, 63334 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding plaintiff did not waive condition by conduct where it
continued to inquire about defendant's ability to satisfy condition). See generally 3A
CORBIN, supra note 19, §§ 752-771, at 478-560 (discussing elimination of conditions
by waiver or prevention); 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, §§ 8.5-8.6, at 586-95 (stating
conditions may be excused by waiver or by other parties' breach that causes nonoc
currence of condition); 5 WILLISTON, supra note 19, §§ 676-811, at 219-903 (dis
cussing excuses for nonperformance of condition); Burton & Andersen, supra note
1, at 872-75 (discussing and citing cases on enforcement of express conditions); see
also Robert A. Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together After Material Breach-Common Law
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Thus, even where the parties by their own agreement have made an
obligation conditional upon the occurrence of some specified
event, the courts may apply one of the "excuse" doctrines to over
ride the express terms of the contract and enforce the obligation in
spite of the nonoccurrence of the condition. 27
Mitigation Rules, the UCC, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U. COLO. L.
REv. 553, 563 (1976) [hereinafter Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together] (discussing
harsh results of strict application of material breach doctrine).
In addition, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 229 provides that a condition
may be excused in order to avoid a forfeiture: "To the extent that the non-occur
rence of a condition would cause disproportionate forfeiture, a court may excuse
the non-occurrence of that condition unless its occurrence was a material part of
the agreed exchange." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229; see 2 FARNS
WORTH, supra note 5, § 8.7, at 384 (discussing impracticability as excuse and dispro
portionate forfeiture). As discussed in comment b to § 229, "'forfeiture' is used to
refer to the denial of compensation that results when the obligee loses his right to
the agreed exchange after he has relied substantially, as by preparation or per
formance on the expectation of the exchange." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON
TRACTS, § 229 cmt. b. Thus, for example, if a builder has already purchased
supplies and substantially completed construction, there might be a disproportion
ate forfeiture suffered by that builder if the owner could invoke the nonoccur
rence of a condition, for example, the failure to comply with some minor aspect of
the contract specifications, as a basis for avoiding its contractual obligation to pay
the builder for the work already done. See American Ins. Co. v. C.S. McCrossan,
Inc., 829 F.2d 702, 705 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding express condition regarding ap
proval of premium computation by third party excused to prevent forfeiture);
Sahadi v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 706 F.2d 193, 199 (7th Cir. 1983)
(noting express condition regarding effect of late payment may be excused to pre
vent forfeiture); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Murphy, 538 A.2d 219, 222-24 (Conn.
1988) (holding insured's failure to comply with timely notice condition in insur
ance contract did not automatically discharge insurer, given contract of adhesion
and forfeiture to insured, as long as insured can show no material prejudice to
insurer); Miles v. CEC Homes, Inc., 753 P.2d 1021, 1026-27 (Wyo. 1988) (holding
condition, requiring one contractor to inform other of specifications before incur
ring expenses, excused, in part to prevent forfeiture).
27. See Hillman, Analysis of Cessation, supra note 3, at 633-34 (observing that
courts will disregard express conditions in situations that would otherwise violate
certain "fairness" norms such as unconscionability and forfeiture); see also UHS
Qualicare, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Community Hosp., Inc., 525 So. 2d 746, 756 (Miss.
1987) (interpreting termination clause allowing termination for any failure to per
form any material term of contract as allowing termination only for material breach
of any material term because court considered any other reading to "produce
harsh, unreasonable, expensive and unintended consequences").
Despite the traditional maxim of contract law that express conditions will be
strictly enforced, courts use a variety of techniques for circumventing them. See
Burton & Andersen, supra note I, at 872 (arguing that express conditions often are
not strictly enforced). Thus, courts have lessened the freedom to contract by sub
jecting express conditions and provisions to unconscionability tests and other re
lated doctrines such as forfeiture, good faith and public policy. See Hillman,
Analysis of Cessation, supra note 3, at 621 & n.25 (discussing unconscionability and
related doctrines in context of express right of cessation provisions). Unconscio
nability generally encompasses unequal bargaining position or bargaining miscon
duct, including fraud, duress and the duty to disclose. [d. Although courts are
generally reluctant to override express contract provisions, "they have intervened
on unconscionability and related grounds to ensure some degree of balance in the
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Constructive Conditions

Not all conditions, however, are created by the express agree
ment of the parties. Some conditions are supplied by the courts in
circumstances where "the parties have omitted a term that is essen
tial to a determination of their rights and duties."28 For example,
an employment contract may not specify when the obligation to pay
for services rendered will be excused; it may simply describe the
obligations of the employee and the compensation to be paid. If
the employee fails to perform as promised, the employer may assert
that its obligation to pay was conditioned on the employee's per
formance of those contractual obligations, even though the con
tract does not so specify. Historically, the common law provided
that in such an instance, the promises of the employer were in
dependent of the obligations of the employee and that the em
ployer had no right to terminate or to withhold pay.29 Then, in the
historic case of Kingston v. Preston,30 Lord Mansfield laid the
fruits of the exchange." Id. at 622. See generally, Robert Childres, Conditions in the
Law of Contracts, 45 N.Y.V. L. REv. 33 (1970) (documenting failure of courts to
enforce strictly express conditions with any consistency).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 226 cmt. c. The Second Restate
ment states that "[a]n event may be made a condition either by the agreement of
the parties ar by a term supplied by the court." Id. § 226 (emphasis added). Therefore,
when parties have omitted a term that is essential to a determination of their rights
and duties, a term, which is reasonable under the circumstances, may be supplied
by the court. Id. This supplied term is a constructive condition. Id.
Corbin notes that courts may hold that a constructive condition is required,
even if the parties had no intention that the fact or event should operate as such
and did nothing from which such an inference can be drawn. 3A CORBIN, supra
note 19, § 632, at 22. "It is operative as a condition for the reason that courts have
held or will hold it so on grounds of justice that are independent of expressed
intention." Id.
29. See 3A CORBIN, supra note 19, § 654, at 163 (discussing history of implied
and constructive conditions); 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.9, at 398 (surveying
cases involving implied and constructive conditions); 6 WILLISTON, supra note 19,
§ 816, at 28 (discussing original independence of mutual promises); Clinton W.
Francis, The Structure ofJudicial Administration and the Droelopment of Contract Law in
Sroenteenth-Century England, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 35, 102-09 (1983) (discussing the
notion of mutual promises).
Williston states that: "It was settled law for centuries that mutual promises un
less containing express conditions were independent. This had certainly become
established as to mutual covenants by the year 1500 and probably earlier, and re
mained unquestioned law both as to covenants and simple contracts until the
eighteenth century." 6 WILLISTON, supra note 19, § 816, at 28. Therefore, prior to
the recognition of bilateral contracts, failure by a promisor to perform his or her
promise did not affect the other party's duty. See 3A CORBIN, supra note 19, § 654,
at 136 (discussing history of implied and constructive conditions).
30. 99 Eng. Rep. 437 (K.B. 1773). The report of this case which is commonly
relied on appears in the argument of counsel in Jones v. Barkley, 99 Eng. Rep. 434
(K.B.1781). See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.9, at 398-403 (discussing Kingston
further); 6 WILLISTON, supra note 19, § 817, at 29-30 (same).
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groundwork for the eventual development of the doctrines of sub
stantial performance and material breach. 31 By reading into the
contract a condition where the parties themselves had not ex
pressed one, Lord Mansfield recognized that parties have a general
expectation of the interdependence of their performance
obligations. 32
Based on this expectation, the courts and later the drafters of
the Restatements of Contracts developed the doctrine of construc
tive conditions and material breach as we know it today. Returning
to our hypothetical employment agreement, if the contract itself
did not specify that the employer's obligation to pay was condi
tioned on the employee's performance of its contractual obliga
tions, the court will probably provide that missing term, i.e., it will
construe the employee's performance obligations as conditions to
the employer's obligation to pay, creating what the Second Restate
ment calls a "constructive condition."33

31. Williston notes that even after 200 years, the principles set forth in King
ston v. Preston still represent the law. 6 WILLISTON, supra note 19, § 817, at 30.
32. In Kingston, a silk mercer and his apprentice made a contract which pro
vided that after one year and a quarter, the mercer was to convey the business to
the apprentice and a partner. Kingston, 99 Eng. Rep. at 437. In return, the ap
prentice was to pay for his share of the business in monthly installments and to
assure these payments, give "good and sufficient security." Id. The apprentice
sued the mercer for failure to convey the business, and the mercer defended by
alleging that the apprentice had not given the required security. Id. The appren
tice argued that the mercer's promise to convey was independent of his promise to
give security. !d. Lord Mansfield rejected this argument and held for the defend
ant mercer. Id. at 438. Lord Mansfield stated that there were instances where one
promise under a bilateral contract was dependent on a return promise and in such
cases nonperformance of the return promise was an excuse for the nonperform
ance of the first promise. Id. Under Lord Mansfield's approach, the court deter
mines whether a promise by one of the parties is dependent upon the other's
return promise. Id. If it is, the court then supplies a term that makes the first
party's promise conditional on performance of the return promise. Id.
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 226 cmt. c ("When the parties
have omitted a term that is essential to a determination of their rights and duties,
the court may supply a term which is reasonable under the circumstances. [Such
terms are] often described as ·"constructive.'" (citation omitted»; see also 3A
CORBIN, supra note 19, § 653, at 132 ("A constructive condition has been defined as
a fact or event that is operative as such on grounds of fairness and justice, even
though the parties expressed no intention whatever."); 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note
5, § 8.9, at 398 ("Constructive conditions of exchange play an essential role in
assuring parties to a bilateral contract that they will actually receive the perform
ance that they have been promised."); 6 WILLISTON, supra note 19, § 825, at 57-60
(criticizing fiction of "implied intent" to create dependent promises and uses term
"constructive conditions imposed by law" as better reflecting the reality behind
such dependency). See generally Edwin W. Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Con
tracts, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 907-28 (1942) (discussing constructive conditions).
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As the Second Restatement obseIVes, however, courts may treat
a constructive condition differently from a condition expressly pro
vided for by the parties-

[T]o the extent that the parties have, by a term of their
agreement, clearly made an event a condition, they can be
confident that a court will ordinarily feel constrained
strictly to apply that term, while the same court may re
gard itself as having considerable latitude in tailoring a
similar term that it has itself supplied. 34
This latitude is reflected in the doctrine of material breach.
C.

Material Breach

The doctrine of material breach is based on the law's willing
ness to construe, as a term of all contracts, that "it is a condition of
each party's remaining duties to render performances to be ex
changed under an exchange of promises that there be no uncured
material failure by the other party to render any such performance
due at an earlier time."35 In other words, if one party has commit
ted a "material failure" to perform its already due contractual obli
gations, the other party can assert that its own contractual
obligations have not become due; the breaching party's obligation
to perform is thus construed by the courts as a condition to the
other party's obligation to perform. In more concrete terms, the
obligation of the employer to pay the employee in our hypothetical
contract is constructively conditioned on the employee's perform
ance of its obligations under the contract. The court's latitude in
applying this constructive condition lies in its determination of
whether or not the party's failure to perform is "material," that is, is
it serious enough to excuse the other party from performing?
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 226 cmt. c; cf. Brees v. Cramer,
586 A.2d 1284, 1287-89 (Md. 1991) (refusing to construe husband's promise to
name wife as beneficiary of life insurance policy in separation agreement as con
structive condition to wife's promise to waive her rights to any interest in hus
band's estate, based on presumed intent and public policy). See generally MXL
Indus. v. Mulder, 623 N.E.2d 369, 374-76 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining differ
ence between express conditions, which require strict compliance, and construc
tive conditions, which are satisfied by substantial performance); Della Ratta v.
American Better Community Dev., Inc., 380 A.2d 627, 637-38 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1977) (explaining and distinguishing constructive condition doctrine from express
conditions); Northeast Custom Homes, Inc. v. Howell, 553 A.2d 387, 389-90 (NJ.·
Super. 1988) (distinguishing process of "construction," in which court supplies
terms, from process of "interpretation" in which court simply interprets); Heinrich
v. R.L. Oil & Gas Co., 442 N.w.2d 467, 471 (S.D. 1989) (supplying constructive
condition requiring seller to cooperate with buyer in obtaining financing).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237.
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1. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent
In his well-known opinion in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,S6
Judge Cardozo provided much of the analytic framework for deter
mining when a failure to perform is serious enough to excuse the
other party from performing. InJacob & Youngs, the plaintiffs were
builders hired by the defendant to build an expensive home. s7 De
fendant refused to pay the plaintiffs the final amount due on the
contract, asserting that plaintiffs had installed a brand of pipe other
than that specified in the contract. S8 Plaintiffs sued for payment of
the amount owed, claiming that the pipes installed were equivalent
in quality to those called for in the contract. S9 The trial court re
fused to admit evidence with respect to this equivalence and, on the
basis of the plaintiffs' failure to comply with the contractual specifi
cations with respect to the pipes, directed a verdict in favor of the
defendant. 40 Mter the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Divi
sion reversed and granted a new trial, the defendant appealed to
the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Divi
sion and ordered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.41
Writing for the majority, Judge Cardozo explored the distinc
tion between dependent and independent promises and observed
that some promises, "though dependent and thus conditions when
there is departure in point of substance, will be viewed as independ
ent and collateral when the departure is insignificant."42 In other
words, where a failure to perform a promise is substantial, that
promise will be construed as a condition to the other party's obliga
tions. On the other hand, where the failure is insubstantial, the
promise will be construed as independent and not a condition of
the other party's obligation to perform. The more difficult ques
tion for Judge Cardozo is how to determine when a particular fail
ure to perform is significant enough to render that promise
dependent:
Considerations partly of justice and partly of presumable
intention are to tell us whether this or that promise shall
be placed in one class or in another. The simple and the
uniform will call for different remedies from the multifari36. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
37. Id. at 890.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42.Id.
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ous and the intricate. . . . There will be harshness some
times and oppression in the implication of a condition
when the thing upon which labor has been expended is
incapable of surrender because united to the land, and
equity and reason in the implication of a like condition
when the subject-matter, if defective, is in shape to be
returned. 43
Thus, Judge Cardozo recognized that notions of equity and forfei
ture must be considered in determining whether a failure to per
form should excuse the other party. If the breaching party will
suffer a forfeiture because its defective work cannot be returned, it
would be less fair to excuse the nonbreaching party than where the
nonbreaching party can return to the breaching party the defective
goods. As Kent could not return the pipes already installed into his
house to the builders, Judge Cardozo would weigh that factor
against Kent in determining if the builders had materially
breached.
Judge Cardozo also believed that the reasonable expectations
of the nonbreaching party must be weighed in such determina
tions: "Intention not otherwise revealed may be presumed to hold
in contemplation the reasonable and probable. If something else is
in view, it must not be left to implication. There will be no assump
tion of a purpose to visit venial faults with oppressive retribution."44
In other words, if a party intends to make a trivial defect by the
other party enough to excuse itself from performing, it had better
expressly state that in its contract. Otherwise, the law will assume
that the intention was that only significant defects in the breaching
party's performance will excuse the nonbreaching party from per
forming. Judge Cardozo observed that "[w]here the line is to be
drawn between the important and the trivial cannot be settled by a
formula."45 He recognized that this question must be determined
on a case-by-case basis, looking to promote justice based on the rea
sonable expectations of the parties. 46
One situation, however, where Judge Cardozo concluded some
limits could be stated was that involving an intentional breach:
"The willful transgressor must accept the penalty of his transgres
sion. For him there is no occasion to mitigate the rigor of implied
43. [d. at 890-91.
44. [d. at 891.
45. [d.
46. See id. (stating "[t]he question is one of degree ... to be answered by the
triers of the facts").
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conditions. The transgressor whose default is unintentional and
trivial may hope for mercy if he will offer atonement for his
wrong."47 The moral tone of this language is unmistakable. Car
dozo believed that in addition to concerns of fairness, the court
should consider the conduct of the breaching party: was he or she
operating in good faith? Although Cardozo does not explain what
he means by a "willful transgressor," he made it clear that the inten
tions of that transgressor were an important factor to consider. 48
In sum,Judge Cardozo outlined three basic factors that should
inform decisions about whether a breach is trivial or significant
enough to excuse the nonbreaching party from performing. These
factors are the degree of harm to the breaching party, in particular,
the possibility that that party will suffer inequitable forfeiture if the
contract is terminated; the degree of harm caused by the breach to
the reasonable expectations of the nonbreaching party; and good
faith.49
2.

The Restatement Definition oj Material Breach

The same factors discussed by Judge Cardozo inJacob & Youngs
were incorporated into the Restatement (Second) oj Contracts defini
tion of a "material" failure to perform. The Second Restatement
defined a "material failure" in section 241:
In determining whether a failure to render or to offer per
formance is material, the following circumstances are
significant:
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be de
prived of the benefit which he reasonably expected;
(b) the extent to which the injured party can be ade
quately compensated for the part of that benefit of which
he will be deprived;
(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform
or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture;
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or
to offer to perform will cure his failure, taking account of
all the circumstances including any reasonable assurances;
47. Id. (citations omitted).
48. See id. (stating "[w]e must weigh ... the excuse for deviation from the
letter").

49. See id. (listing factors as purpose to be served, desire to be gratified, ex
cuse for deviation and cruelty of enforced adherence).
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(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party fail
ing to perform or to offer to perform comports with stan
dards of good faith and fair dealing. 50
'\

I

I

I

!

J

As in Jacob & Youngs, the Second Restatement thus calls for consid
eration of the degree of harm caused by the breach to the reason
able expectations of the nonbreaching party (factors (a) and (b»;
the degree of harm to the breaching party if the contract is termi
nated (factor (c»; and the good faith of the breaching party (fac
tors (d) and (e».51
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1979). A number of courts
have applied § 241 of the Second Restatement. See Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equip.
Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 992 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding breach of confidentiality
clause in patent agreement was material, discharging plaintiff from obligations
under contract), overruled by A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960
F.2d 1020, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (denying motion for summary judgment on issue
of material breach); O'Connell Management Co. v. Carlyle-XIII Managers, Inc.,
765 F. Supp. 779, 783 (D. Mass. 1991) (holding genuine issue of material fact ex
isted as to whether building manager materially breached by informing potential
tenant of suitable space in other buildings and as to whether breach was curable
and cured); Jafari v. Wally Findlay Galleries, 741 F. Supp. 64, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(finding purchaser's failure to tender payment for painting by deadline was mate
rial breach, discharging seller from any obligation under contract); Tyro Indus.,
Inc. v. Trevose Constr. Co., 737 F. Supp. 856, 865 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding failure
to maintain liability insurance was material breach of contract, entitling contractor
to terminate); Conam Alaska v. Bell Lavalin, Inc., 842 P.2d 148, 159 (Alaska 1992)
(affirming jury verdict that breach was not material); Fitz v. Coutinho, 622 A.2d
1220, 1223 (N.H. 1993) (affirming trial court's determination that party's failure
to tender payment was not material breach).
51. The doctrine of substantial performance views problems of failure to per
form from a different angle, but with the same underlying concerns. According to
this parallel doctrine, if a party substantially performs its contractual obligations,
the other party is not excused from performing. For a discussion of substantial
performance, see 3A CORBIN, supra note 19, §§ 700-712, at 308-51 (discussing sub
stantial performance, its character and effect); 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.12,
at 414 (same); 6 WILLISTON, supra note 19, § 842, at 165-71 (same). It is sometimes
said that substantial performance doctrine is the flip side of material breach doc
trine: If a party substantially performs, that party has not committed a material
breach; on the other hand, if a party has not substantially performed, then it has
committed a material breach. See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.16, at 442 ("The
doctrine of material breach is simply the converse of the doctrine of substantial
performance."); 6 WILLISTON, supra note 19, § 842, at 165-66 (arriving at same con
clusion). Determinations of substantial performance consider many factors similar
to those used in determinations of material breach: the extent of nonperformance,
the extent to which the nonbreaching party has been denied the benefits of the
contract, the willfulness of the breach and the extent to which the nonbreaching
party can be compensated in damages. See generaUy 3A CORBIN, supra note 19,
§§ 704-707, at 318-31 (discussing factors considered when determining material
breach); 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.12, at 414-22 (same). Similar to determi
nations of material breach, determinations of substantial performance are fact
based and not easily predicted. As Corbin said:
It is not easy to lay down rules for determining what amounts to "substan
tial performance" ... in any particular case. It is always a question of fact,
a matter of degree. a question that must be determined relatively to all
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Assuming that the failure to perform is a material one, the Sec
ond Restatement provides that the nonbreaching party is entitled
initially to suspend or withhold performance of its contractual obli
gations. If, however, that failure to perform remains uncured, the
obligations of the nonbreaching party may be discharged com
pletely.52 Section 242 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
provides:
In determining the time after which a party's uncured ma
terial failure to render or to offer performance discharges
the other party's remaining duties to render performance
under the rules stated in [sections] 237 and 238, the fol
lowing circumstances are significant:
(a) those stated in [section] 241;
(b) the extent to which it reasonably appears to the
injured party that delay may prevent or hinder him in
making reasonable substitute arrangements;
the other complex factors that exist in every instance. The variation in
these factors is such that generalization is difficult and the use of cases as
precedents is dangerous.
3A CORBIN, supra note 19, § 704, at 318-19.
Given the essential identity of the two doctrines, the discussion herein of "ma
terial breach" doctrine and its flaws applies as well to "substantial performance"
doctrine.
52. Corbin used different terminology; he distinguished between "total
breach" and "partial breach":
A total breach ... is a non-performance of duty that is so material and
important as to justify the injured party in regarding the whole transac
tion as at an end .... A total breach by A will usually terminate B's duty
to perform any further on his part, but it does not always do so.
4 CORBIN, supra note 19, § 946, at 809. In contrast, "[a] partial breach by one party
... does not justify the other party's subsequent failure to perform; both parties
may be guilty of breaches, each having a right to damages." Id. at 811 (footnote
omitted). Corbin recognized that the courts often use other terminology: "not
infrequently the term material breach is used to mean one that the injured party
can elect to treat as a total breach." Id. at 813 (footnote omitted). Williston also
distinguished between "partial" and "total" breach. 11 WILLISTON, supra note 19,
§ 1292, at 8-11 (stating that slight breach may not excuse injured party from per
formance). Farnsworth uses the term "material breach" to refer to the circum
stances which justify a party in suspending its own performance, as in § 241 of the
Second Restatement. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, §§ 8.15-8.18, at 435-55. The
Second Restatement uses the terms "total breach" and "partial breach" to distin
guish between different ways of calculating contract damages. RESTATEMENT (SEC
OND) OF CONTRACfS § 236. The Second Restatement uses the term "uncured
material failure" to describe the circumstances which determine whether or not a
nonbreaching party is excused from performance. See id. § 237 ("[I]t is a condi
tion of each party's remaining duties to render performances to be exchanged
under an exchange of promises that there be no uncured material failure by the
other party to render any such performance due at an earlier time.").
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(c) the extent to which the agreement provides for
performance without delay, but a material failure to per
form or to offer to perform on a stated day does not of
itself discharge the other party's remaining duties unless
the circumstances, including the language of the agree
ment, indicate that performance or an offer to perform by
that day is important. 53
Thus, if the breaching party's failure is a material one, as defined in
section 241, and that failure remains uncured for a period of time
beyond that allowed by the intent of the contract or for a period of
time which hinders the ability of the nonbreaching party to find a
reasonable substitute, then not only can the nonbreaching party
withhold performance of its contractual obligations temporarily, it
can withhold performance permanently. In other words, it can
"cancel" or "terminate" the entire contract. 54 For example, if the
employee's material failure to perform as promised remains un
cured beyond a reasonable time as determined under section 242,
the employer will be discharged from paying that employee under
the terms of the contract.

53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242. There are very few cases
expressly relying on or interpreting § 242. Compare Commonwealth Petroleum Co.
v. Billings, 759 P.2d 736, 738-39 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (determining, for purposes
of right to terminate under § 242, whether time was of essence in contract for
assignment of lease, required consideration of number of factors resulting in find
ing that time was not of essence), with Garcia v. Alfonso, 490 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding time was of essence and contract properly termi
nated where buyers did not obtain financing until three weeks after 3O-day period
specified in contract had expired). For a critical discussion of § 242 and its incor
poration of the opportunity to cure a material failure to perform, see William H.
Lawrence, Cure After Breach of Contract Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts: An
Analytical Comparison with the Unifarm Commercial Code, 70 MINN. L. REv. 713, 723-24,
735-36 (1986).
54. Farnsworth uses the word "terminate" to describe the right of the non
breaching party to "put an end to the contract" after an uncured material failure
to perform. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.18, at 447. Others also use this termi
nology. See, e.g., Rosett, supra note 1, at 1086 (noting that after material breach,
nonbreaching party may be justified in terminating his or her own performance).
Some commentators instead describe this right as a right to "cancel" the contract.
See, e.g., Eric G. Andersen, A New Look at Material Breach in the Law of Contracts, 21
V.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1073, 1075 (1988) (noting that under VCC nonbreaching party
"is entitled to 'cancel' the contract"). The drafters of the Second Restatement
described the effect of an uncured material failure to perform as a "discharge" of
the remaining duties of the nonbreaching parties. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEC
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 242 (discussing determination of dischargeability of remain
ing duties). All these different terms reflect the same underlying concept: At
some point a nonbreaching party has a right to claim that it no longer has any
obligation to perform its duties under the contract.

HeinOnline -- 42 Vill. L. Rev. 81 1997

82

VILlANOVA

LAw

REVIEW

[Vol. 42: p. 65

The rights of the parties thus depend greatly on whether or
not a particular failure to perform is a material failure, or as usually
referred to by the courts, whether or not it is a material breach.
Unfortunately, as the cases reveal, instead of focusing onJudge Car
dozo's three principal concerns, the courts have often become en
tangled in the various factors outlined in section 241 and have not
provided clear discussion of why a particular breach is or is not con
sidered material. This unfocused case law has made it extremely
difficult to determine whether or not a particular failure is.
material. 55
55. Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is interesting to note that
similar problems exist with respect to the doctrine of anticipatory breach.
Whereas material breach doctrine deals with a failure to perform contractual obli
gations that have become due, anticipatory breach doctrine deals with the
problems created where one party indicates, by words or conduct, that it will not or
cannot perform contractual obligations that are not yet due. The doctrinal re
sponse to this problem is in some ways similar to the response to problems of
material breach. An anticipatory breach is held to discharge the non breaching
party's obligations to perform any duties remaining under its contract. "Where
performances are to be exchanged under an exchange of promises, one party's
repudiation of a duty to render performance discharges the other party's remain
ing duties to render performance." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 253(2}. See generally 6 CORBIN, supra note 19, §§ 1255, 1259-1260, at 21-22, 31-38;
2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, §§ 8.20-8.23, at 466-92; 11 WILLISTON, supra note 19,
§§ 1300-1312, at 76-110. That is, as with a material breach that remains uncured,
an anticipatory breach entitles the nonbreaching party to suspend and ultimately
terminate its obligation under the contract.
As with the doctrine of material breach, however, there is considerable diffi
culty in knowing for certain whether a party has, in fact, committed an anticipatory
breach. First of all, "the threatened breach ... must be serious enough that the
injured party could treat it as total if it occurred." 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5,
§ 8.21, at 474-75 (footnote omitted). In addition, in order to find that the party
has anticipatorily breached the contract, one must consider the words and/or con
duct used to create the impression of an intention not to perform as promised.
Thus, as Farnsworth describes it, "[t]he statement must be sufficiently positive to
be reasonably understood as meaning that the breach will actually occur. A party's
expressions of doubt as to its willingness or ability to perform do not constitute a
repudiation." [d. § 8.21, at 475 (footnote omitted); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 250 cmt. b ("In order to constitute a repudiation, a party's language
must be sufficiently positive to be reasonably interpreted to mean that the party
will not or cannot perform. Mere expression of doubt as to his willingness or abil
ity to perform is not enough to constitute a repudiation .... "). See generally 2
FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.21, at 474-75 ("For repudiation to have legal effect,
the threatened breach must be serious.... [E]xpressions of doubt ... do not
constitute repudiation."). A contract can be repudiated by conduct only if the
party has voluntarily acted in a way that makes its performance of its contractual
obligation impossible. Delay or unwillingness reflected in conduct is not enough.
See id. § 8.21, at 479; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 250 cmt. c
("In order to constitute a repudiation, a party's act must be both voluntary and
affirmative, and must make it actually or apparently impossible for him to per
form."); 4 CORBIN, supra note 19, § 954, at 829 (surveying breach by repudiation).
Obviously, such standards require the nonbreaching party to weigh and interpret
the statements and/or conduct before deciding to suspend its own performance.
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APPROACH

Professor Eric G. Andersen provided a very thorough evalua
tion of the way courts have relied on section 241 to determine mate
rial breach. 56 Professor Andersen asserted that the Second
Restatement factors have failed to provide a coherent or meaning
ful approach to determining a material failure. According to Pro
fessor Andersen, "the Restatement factors fall seriously short of
providing a workable definition of materiality."57 He asserted that
the Second Restatement provides no "underlying, unifying princi
ple more specific than 'fairness' or )ustice'" to use in determining
how to weigh or balance the various factors. 58 Professor Andersen
An incorrect assessment of the other party's intent or ability to perform can lead to
liability if the nonbreaching party withholds its performance.
56. See Andersen, supra note 54, at 1089-92 (analyzing judicial application of
§ 241).
57. Id. at 1083 (noting that most obvious failing of Second Restatement fac
tors is absence of any guidance on their relative priorities or how to combine
them).
58. Id. Andersen reviewed the ways that the courts have treated the § 241
factors in many decided cases. He argued that the first factor, "the extent to which
the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected,"
which is apparently intended to consider the gravity of the nonperformance, is
unhelpful because it provides no substantive content to determine that gravity. Id.
at 1085.
He argued that the second factor, "the extent to which the injured party can
be adequately compensated for the part of the benefit of which he will be de
prived," is an inappropriate factor for determining material breach because its fo
cus is on the need for certainty in recovering compensatory damages. Id. The
courts and the Second Restatement comments appear to consider a breach more
likely to be "material" and thus relieving the nonbreaching party of its contractual
obligations when the non breaching party would have difficulty proving the actual
damages caused by that breach with the degree of certainty which contract law
requires. As Andersen points out, if the certainty requirement is itself justified as a
matter of contract law, "it is not clear why cancellation should be available in place
of damages when the requirement is not satisfied." Id. at 1085-86. In other words,
the provability of actual damages caused by a breach should not be relevant to
determining whether or not the breach itself is a material one.
The third factor, "the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer
to perform will suffer forfeiture," Andersen considered relevant, but not as a factor
for determining the materiality of the breach itself. Andersen argued that the
question of materiality should focus on the impact of the breach on the non
breaching party, not the effect of cancellation on the breaching party. Id. at 1087.
He would consider forfeiture as a relevant factor in determining the breaching
party's right to restitution and the extent of the nonbreaching party's right to with
hold its own performance, but not as a factor in determining materiality and thus
the basic right of the nonbreaching party to suspend or withhold its performance.
Id. at 1111-22.
With respect to the fourth § 241 factor, "the likelihood that the party failing to
perform or to offer to perform will cure his failure," Andersen believed that this
should be a factor considered in determining material breach, but claimed that
without some explanatory framework to explain the doctrine of material breach, it
is not possible for the courts to consider this factor appropriately. Id. at 1087.
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then discussed the ways that the courts have dealt with this flawed
set of factors, and he concluded that the courts either cite the fac
tors and disregard them, or rely on one or more factors without a
thorough or satisfying analysis of those factors. Thus, Professor An
dersen concluded that the doctrine of material breach, as defined
in section 241 and as applied by the courts, is so riddled with ambi
guity and imprecision that it fails to provide parties to the contract
with sufficient guidance for determining whether or not a particu
lar failure to perform will be considered materia1. 59
A look at some recent cases applying the doctrine of material
breach illustrates some of these flaws in the material breach doc
trine. For example, Stone Forest Industries, Inc. v. United State§,O illus
trates the arbitrariness and uncertainty of material breach doctrine.
In this case, the United States Forest Service had entered into a
contract with the plaintiff whereby the plaintiff was allowed to re
move timber from land in a national forest in exchange for pay
ment. 61 The plaintiff had made certain advance deposits and then
was denied access to some of the land covered by the contract. The
plaintiff requested a return of a portion of its deposits, and the For
est Service refused to return the entire amount requested. 62 After
finding that the Forest Service had in fact denied the plaintiff ac
cess to 15.89% of the land covered by the contract, the court con
cluded that this amounted to a material breach of the contract,
entitling the plaintiff to a return of the portion of that amount of its
Finally, regarding the fifth § 241 factor, "the extent to which the behavior of
the party failing to perform or to offer to perform comports with the standards of
good faith and fair dealing," Andersen asserted that while the state of mind of the
breaching party may be a relevant factor to consider in determining the materiality
of the breach, as phrased in § 241, this factor is meaningless, because "no general
consensus exists about the meaning of that term and because of the lack of a gen
eral theory of materiality within which good faith can operate." Id. at 1088.
59. Id. at 1088-89; see also Lawrence, supra note 53, at 746 (criticizing "waver
ing material breach standard" of Second Restatement because it causes uncer
tainty); Rosett, supra note 1, at 1091-92 (difficulty in distinguishing between failure
of condition which discharges performance obligations as opposed to one which
merely suspends them leads to uncertainty for party deciding how to respond to
such failure); Geller, supra note 5, at 181-92 (outlining various risks, situational
and legal, that parties face when trying to determine how to respond to failure to
perform by other party to contract).
60. 973 F.2d 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
61. Id. at 1549. Stone Forest Industries ("SFI") agreed to purchase, cut and
remove 19,430 MBF (thousand board feet) of timber in the Klamath National For
est in California. Id. The contract termination date of March 31, 1980 was ex
tended several times, until the contract finally terminated on September 3, 1985.
Id. On September 28, 1984, the California Wilderness Act was enacted. Id. This
Act affected four of the 14 units of SFI's contract. Id. As a result, access was de
nied to these four units. [d.
62. Id. at 1550.
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deposit representing the portion of land to which it was denied ac
cess. 63 The court distinguished the case from an earlier case, Everett
Plywood Corp. v. United States,64 where the plaintiff was denied access
to only 6.5% of the lumber covered by a contract with the Forest
Service and no material breach was found. 65 Although the Stone
Forest court observed that "percentages alone are not always disposi
tive,"66 it did not explain why a denial of access to 15.89% consti
tuted a material breach, but a denial of access to 6.5% did not.
Thus, the Forest Service in future cases might be led to assume that
a material breach of a timber removal contract may be committed if
they deny access to somewhere between 6.5% and 15.89% of the
land covered by the contract.
The uncertainty of material breach determinations and the
risks created by that uncertainty is also illustrated by Health Related
Services v. Golden Plains Convalescent Center,67 which involved plain
tiff's ten-year contract to operate and manage defendant's nursing
home. Mter the management company was acquired by a different
corporation almost five years into the contract, the nursing home
began to be dissatisfied with the manager's performance and at the
end of the sixth year terminated its contract, alleging material fail
ures to perform. 68 The management company sued, seeking lost
profits as damages, and the nursing home counterclaimed, alleging
damages from the management company's unsatisfactory
performance. 69
At trial, the nursing home submitted evidence that the man
agement company had paid vendor invoices late, had failed to ob
tain Medicare reimbursements, had failed to supply payroll checks
and had failed to staff the facility adequately.7o Although there was
63. [d. at 1552. The court observed that the materiality of a breach is deter
mined in light of the totality of events and circumstances. [d. (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 cmt. a (1974». It is incorrect, therefore, to "mea
sure each contributing element separately and, finding it small, remove it from the
equation." [d.
64. 512 F.2d 1082 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
65. Stone Farest, 973 F.2d at 1552. Significantly, the Everett court stated that the
denial of access to only a portion of the lumber" 'neither defeated the whole pur
pose of the contract nor deprived plaintiff of substantially all it had bargained
for.'" [d. (quoting Everett, 512 F.2d at 1093-94).
66. [d. In stating that the percentages alone are not dispositive, the Stone Far
est court cited, with approval, the Second Restatement view that" 'it is impossible to
lay down a rule that can be applied with mathematical exactness.'" [d. (quoting
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 275 cmt. a (1932».
67. 806 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
68. [d. at 103-04.
69. [d. at 104.
70. [d. at 105.
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evidence that the management company had been responsive and
had corrected some of the problems, there was also evidence that
some problems had never been fully resolved. Even in the face of
this evidence, the jury found for the management company and
awarded damages. 71
The nursing home appealed, but the Missouri Court of Appeals upheld the jury's verdict, saying only that:
It is not every dissatisfaction with a contract performance,

nor even every breach-but only a material breach-that
excuses performance by the other party. The circum
stances significant to that determination are given in Re
statement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1981) .... It is
sufficient to say that, under those principles, neither the
evidence nor the arguments [defendant] brings to bear,
shows any [plaintiff] neglect that constitutes a material
failure to perform under the contract. 72
The court never explained how section 241 should be applied to
the evidence submitted or why the problems experienced by the
nursing home were not sufficiently serious to justify termination of
its contract with the management company.73
Given this ambiguity and uncertainty in material breach deter
minations, a nonbreaching party can expose itself to liability if it
decides to suspend its own performance. For example, in the
71. [d. at 106.
72. [d. at 105 (citations omitted).
73. The uncertainty of predicting whether or not a breach is material is not
uncommon. See Eastern Ill. Trust & Say. Bank v. Sanders, 826 F.2d 615, 618-19
(7th Cir. 1987) (affirming district court's finding that bank's granting of addi
tional side loans to borrower in breach of explicit term of guaranty agreement with
Small Business Administration was not material breach); Sahadi v. Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 706 F.2d 193,200 (7th Cir. 1983) (reversing district court
summary judgment on issue of materiality of breach because issue of materiality is
factually complex); Fitz v. Coutinho, 622 A.2d 1220, 1223 (N.H. 1993) (noting
whether delay in payment is material breach is complex factual determination and
holding timber buyers delay in payment was not material).
Another indication of the uncertainty involved in determining material
breach is that some courts are reluctant to issue summary judgment where mate
rial breach has been alleged, treating the issue as a question of fact for the jury.
See, e.g., Sahadi, 706 F.2d at 194 (reversing district court grant of summary judg
ment holding material breach had occurred where lender tendered interest pay
ment one day later in breach of express term of contract because of factual
complexity regarding materiality); O'Connell Management Co. v. Carlyle-XIII
Managers, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 779, 784 (D. Mass. 1991) (holding summary judg
ment inappropriate to determine material breach). But see Milner Hotels, Inc. v.
Norfolk & Western Ry., 822 F. Supp. 341, 347 (S.D.W. Va. 1993) (granting sum
mary judgment because where facts not in dispute, material breach is question of
law), affd, 19 F.3d 1429 (4th Cir. 1994).
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Golden Plains case, the nursing home was held liable for terminating
the management company after incorrectly concluding that its fail
ings constituted a material breach.
This phenomenon is further illustrated in McClain v. Kimbrough
Construction CO.74 McClain, a brick mason, entered into a subcon
tract with Kimbrough to do the brick work at a condominium pro
ject for which Kimbrough was the general contractor. 75 McClain
had worked for three weeks, laying over 20,000 bricks, when it was
forced to stop work so that Kimbrough could complete grading
work. 76 By this time, however, Kimbrough had already discovered
several problems with the brick work, and although McClain had
attempted to make some corrections, Kimbrough decided never to
call McClain back to the job after the grading was completed. 77 In
stead, Kimbrough contracted with a different brick mason to finish
the job.
McClain sued Kimbrough for breach of contract, and Kim
brough counterclaimed for the increased costs it incurred as a re
sult of having to replace portions of McClain's work. 78 The trial
court ruled that Kimbrough had breached its contract with McClain
and awarded damages accordingly; it also dismissed Kimbrough's
counterclaim. 79
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that McClain's performance deficiencies did not constitute a mate
rial breach, and therefore, that Kimbrough's failure to give Mc
Clain notice and a reasonable opportunity to correct its work
constituted a material breach of the contract by Kimbrough.
The court observed:

A party who has materially breached a contract is not enti
tled to damages stemming from the other party's later ma
terial breach of the same contract. Thus, in cases where
both parties have not fully performed, it is necessary for
the courts to determine which party is chargeable with the
first uncured material breach.80
The court then found that Kimbrough's failure to provide a suita
ble place to work or a reasonable opportunity to perform and its
74. 806 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).
75. [d. at 196.
76. [d.

77. [d. at 196-97.
78. [d. at 197.
79. [d.
80. [d. at 199 (citations omitted).
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failure to give notice before terminating the contract preceded Mc
Clain's failure to complete the job in a workmanlike manner. 8 }
Therefore, Kimbrough's breaches excused McClain's nonperform
ance, and McClain's nonperformance thus did not prevent it from
recovering damages from Kimbrough.
To the extent material breach doctrine places such signifi
cance on who committed the first material breach, as illustrated by
this case and the Golden Plains case, it fails to treat contract disputes
in a realistic or fair manner. 82 As the cases indicate, all the parties
to the contract may have contributed to the exacerbation of the
dispute. Although one party may have made the first error in per
formance, at some point it is fair to say that both parties have not
fulfilled the promises they made in their contract. For example, in
the McClain case, it appears to be hairsplitting to say that Kim
brough materially breached first by failing to allow McClain to cor
rect the problems with its work. This analysis is particularly
arbitrary, because it is so difficult to say with any certainty whether a
particular breach is material. To determine a party's rights by fo
cusing on the chronological occurrence of problems that really may
be occurring more or less simultaneously seems quite absurd and
even unfair. 83
81. Id.
82. See also Fitz v. Coutinho, 622 A.2d 1220 (N.H. 1993) (demonstrating risks

involved where one party suspends or terminates performance in response to what
it believes is other party's material breach). In Fitz, the defendant had terminated
its contract with plaintiff based on its belief that plaintiff had materially breached
its contract by removing timber in an unworkman-like manner and tendering pay
ments late. Id. at 1222. The plaintiff sued for wrongful termination and prevailed,
based on the court's conclusion that the plaintiff'S breaches were not material. Id.
The defendant was held liable to the plaintiff for its lost profits. Id. at 1223.
83. See Geller, supra note 5, at 190 n.175. In this student Note on the problem
of determining a party's right to withhold performance in response to the other
party's failure to perform as promised, the author analogizes this approach to the
parent who punishes the child "who started it." Id. According to the author, the
court which tries to determine who committed the first material breach is like the
parent who tries to determine which child escalated a dispute by going beyond the
limits of trivial misbehavior and committing a punishable offense. Id. What this
analogy illustrates with respect to material breach doctrine is what most parents
learn when they try to determine "who started it." See id. In the end, that is not
relevant, since at some point both children have contributed to and escalated the
dispute. See id. A similar point can be made with respect to determining material
breach in a contractual dispute. It should not necessarily matter who committed
the first material breach if both parties have contributed to and escalated the
dispute.
See also 2401 Pennsylvania Ave. Corp. v. Federation of Jewish Agencies, 489
A.2d 733 (Pa. 1985). In 2401 Pennsylvania Ave., the plaintiff, who was the owner of
certain real estate, entered into a two-year lease agreement with the defendant to
begin May 1, 1974. Id. at 734. The parties also agreed, however, that in the event
that the current tenant did not vacate by May 1,1974, the plaintiff would have until
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This chronological analysis has important practical significance
for parties involved in a potential contract dispute. If a nonbreach
ing party cannot be sure that the other party's failure to perform
will be considered the first material breach, then that party will not
know whether it is entitled to suspend or withhold its own perform
ance. In fact, as in these cases, the nonbreaching party runs the
risk of being held to have materially breached first if it suspends its
performance or terminates the contract in response to what it
thinks is the other's material breach.
August 31, 1974, to make the premises available to the defendant. [d. at 734-35.
As predicted, the current tenant was unable to vacate by May 1, 1974, and the
defendant seemed to acquiesce to the delay. [d. In June 1974, however, the de
fendant found a building in what it considered a better and less costly location and
purchased it on July 1, 1974. [d. at 735. When the plaintiff's current tenant then
requested an extension of its lease with the plaintiff beyond August 31, 1974, the
plaintiff asked the defendant to approve its right to grant the further extension.
[d. The defendant refused, claiming that the entire lease agreement was invalid
due to the plaintiff's failure to deliver the premises by May 1, 1974, and that it
therefore did not want to do anything to signify that it believed the lease was valid.
[d. The plaintiff thereafter granted its current tenant the requested extension of
its lease through October 31, 1974. [d. at 736. Nonetheless, the plaintiff sent the
defendant a bill for October rent, which the defendant refused to pay. [d. The
plaintiff then sued for anticipatory breach of contract. [d. The trial court awarded
the plaintiff damages of $292,000, plus interest and the defendant appealed. [d. at
734.
Faced with this sad state of events, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court split 4-3.
See id. at 738 (holding for defendant). The majority found that the defendant had
not anticipatorily breached the lease. [d. at 737. Rather, the plaintiff's extension
of its current tenant's lease beyond August 31, 1974, constituted a material breach
of its lease with the defendant, excusing the defendant from any obligation to pay
rent or other damages. [d. at 738. The majority focused on the fact that the de
fendant had not unequivocally indicated a refusal to honor its obligation to pay
rent under the lease. [d. at 737.
Three judges dissented in two separate opinions, but all three would have
held that the defendant did anticipatorily breach the lease by finding other prem
ises and indicating that it had no intention to move into the plaintiff's building.
[d. at 745 (Larsen, j., dissenting); id. at 747 (Hutchinson, j., dissenting). Judge
Larsen further argued that even if the defendant had not committed an anticipa
tory breach by finding other premises, the plaintiff still had not materially
breached by extending the lease of its current tenant because the defendant had
no intention of occupying the premises anyway. [d. at 746 (Larsen,]., dissenting).
Thus the dissenters would have affirmed the trial court's judgment and the award
of damages to the plaintiff. [d. at 747 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
This series of events is symptomatic of the problems in many contract dis
putes. The parties began with good intentions, hoping to have the premises avail
able by May 1, but both recognized the possibility of delay and accepted that
possibility. See id. at 735 (noting that plaintiff expressed these concerns in Novem
ber 1973 letter to defendant). Then, one party, finding a better deal, wanted to
back out of the lease and purported that the delay was its reason. [d. The plaintiff,
claiming that the defendant had anticipatorily breached the contract by finding
other premises, extended its current tenancy, but still sued the defendant for
rental payments. [d. at 736. It appears that to some extent both parties were at
fault, and yet each charged the other with responsibility for the mess they had both
created.

HeinOnline -- 42 Vill. L. Rev. 89 1997

90

VILLANOVA

LAw

REVIEW

[Vol. 42: p. 65

This material breach doctrine, as currently applied, leaves par
ties to contracts without predictable guidelines to follow in deter
mining their conduct. By failing to discuss the actual basis for
whether a breach is or is not material, the courts have not educated
the parties as to what to expect from the law in such cases. 84 By
focusing on which side committed the first material breach, the
courts have compounded the problem by protecting one party
when that party may be just as responsible for the breakdown of the
contract as the other party. Other scholars have proposed alterna
tive models or approaches to the problems addressed by the mate
rial breach doctrine. Although each of these has its merits, for
reasons discussed below, none goes far enough.
IV.

THE GoALS OF MATERIAL BREACH DOCTRINE

Before proposing possible solutions to the problems created by
current material breach doctrine, it is important to consider the
goals the law is seeking to accomplish through contract law and
particularly through material breach doctrine. Possible goals of
contract law include: completion of contractual obligations; eco
nomic efficiency; protecting the expectation and reliance interests
of the parties; and fairness and equity. All of these goals play some
part in contract jurisprudence.
With respect to material breach doctrine in particular, it is
helpful to return to Judge Cardozo's opinion inJacob & Youngs, Inc.
v. Kent. 85 The goal here is not to ensure contract performance at
all costs, nor is it primarily to promote economic efficiency. Rather,
the purpose of determining if a breach is "material" is to decide
whether it is reasonable for the nonbreaching party to be excused
from its contractual obligations because of the other party's breach.
84. See Andersen, supra note 54, at 1075 (noting that many courts that pur
port to follow Restatement actually ignore it when time comes to decide materiality
question and that other courts seem to pick and choose among stated factors with
out justifying their choices); Rosett, supra note I, at 1081-82 (noting that despite
several centuries of effort by legal scholars and jurists, traditional contract law pro
vides no comprehensive set of principles to supply clear answers to central ques
tions in most contract disputes regarding whether there has been performance,
whether there has been brea~h and whether there has been discharge of obliga
tion); Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty and Contract Law, 46 U. PIlT. L. REv. 75, 102-22
(1984) (discussing how uncertainty about litigation outcomes in contract disputes
can lead to inefficient breaches and discourage efficient breaches); Geller, supra
note 5, at 164-65 (stating that courts have applied several different standards to
determine whether withholding performance is proper and because of this, parties
to continuing contracts face substantial risk when they make decisions concerning
withholding following breach of contract).
85. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). For a discussion of Judge Cardozo's opinion in
Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, see supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
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In his article on material breach, Professor Andersen focused

on one ofJudge Cardozo's three factors: the degree of harm caused
by the breach to the reasonable expectations of the nonbreaching
party.86 As conceptualized by Professor Andersen, the doctrine of
material breach must be understood as related to the remedies it
triggers, that is, suspension and cancellation of contract obligations
by the nonbreaching party.87 Professor Andersen described two in
terests of the nonbreaching party that are at stake when the other
party fails to perform as promised. 88 One interest, as labeled by
Professor Anders~n, is the interest in present performance, that is,
the interest of the nonbreaching party in the performance obliga
tions of the other party that have already become due. 89 The other
interest of the nonbreaching party is the interest in future perform
ance, that is, the nonbreaching party's interest in the performance
obligations of the other party that have yet to become due. 90
According to Professor Andersen, it is the interest of the non
breaching party in future performance that the material breach
doctrine is intended to protect and not the interest in present per
formance. 91 Professor Andersen argues that traditional contract
damage remedies are sufficient to protect the nonbreaching party's
interest in the obligations that have already become due and have
not been fulfilled; the nonbreaching party does not need to sus
pend or cancel its performance obligations to protect that inter
est. 92 On the other hand, where the nonbreaching party has
serious concerns regarding the other party's willingness or ability to
perform in the future, then the nonbreaching party may need to
protect itself by suspending or even terminating its own perform
ance. 93 According to Professor Andersen, courts should determine
86. Andersen, supra note 54, at 1092-1111.
87. Id. at 1092 (explaining also that primary policy of remedies is to protect
victim's expectation interest without imposing unnecessary costs on party in
breach).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1092, 1095-1101.
90. Id. at 1092, 1096-1101 (assuming contract is executory, or bilateral, and
not unilateral where only one party has interest in future performance of other
party).
91. Id. at 1104-05 (noting that breach by anticipatory repudiation is "pure"
example of material breach).
92. Id. at 1095 (recognizing, however, that difficult issues may arise in connec
tion with determining amount required to compensate for failure to perform
properly or with decision to award specific relief rather than damages).
93. See id. at 1096, 1106 (noting that security of whether other party will per
form as agreed is one of primary benefits of contractual relationships and propos
ing cancellation may be necessary to protect party's concern about future
performance) .
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whether a breach is material with this concern in mind. 94 Only if
the breach would raise concerns in the mind of the objectively rea
sonable nonbreaching party about the breaching party's future per
formance so that the cancellation remedy is necessary to protect
the nonbreaching party's interest, should that breach be consid
ered material. 95
Professor Andersen's insights and analysis are very valuable. It
is appropriate to link the doctrine of material breach with the rem
edy it triggers. Professor Andersen's analysis focuses, however, too
heavily on only one of the factors relevant to material breach deter
minations: the harm caused by the breach to the reasonable expec
tations of the nonbreaching party.96 According to Professor
Andersen, if the non breaching party is reasonably concerned that
those expectations will not be met, then the breach is material and
the party may suspend performance. 97 Professor Andersen's analy
sis is flawed, however, to the extent that he fails to consider fully
Judge Cardozo's other concerns: harm to the breaching party if the
contract is not terminated and that party's good faith. 98
Professor Andersen did give some consideration to the effects
of termination on the breaching party.99 He recognized that al
lowing the nonbreaching party to terminate the contract based on
its reasonable expectations could produce harsh results for the
breaching party.IOO Thus, he recommended that the law protect at
least the restitutionary interest of the breaching party, and in many
instances the expectation interest as well, by requiring the non
breaching party to compensate the breaching party for the work
done before cancellation. 101 In addition, Professor Andersen
would limit the nonbreaching party's right to withhold moneys due
under the contract to a reasonable amount by considering the
94. [d. at 110~9.
95. [d. at 1106. For additional discussion by Professor Burton on these ideas,
see Burton & Anderson, supra note 1, at 870-72.
96. Andersen, supra note 54, at 1095-1101.
97. Id. at 1107.
98. For a discussion of Judge Cardozo's concerns regarding material breach
doctrine, see supra notes 3649 and accompanying text.
99. Andersen, supra note 54, at 1111-23 (discussing protecting interests of
breaching party and noting that although many jurisdictions grant restitution to
defaulting plaintiff, measure of recovery may be unnecessarily miserly).
100. [d. at 1112 (stating that routine element of conventional material breach
analysis balances harm that breach caused victim against harm that cancellation
would impose on breaching party).
101. [d. at 1116-20 (concluding that this compensation implements policy
that victim's expectation interest to be protected is at least cost to breaching
party).
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value of work already done by the breaching party.I02 In other
words, while upholding the right of the nonbreaching party to can
cel the contract in response to a material breach, Professor Ander
sen would require the nonbreaching party to compensate the
breaching party in order to prevent a result that is too harsh. lOS
Other scholars have also recognized the need to provide some
compensation to the breaching party. This view has often been ra
tionalized on the basis of contract law's nonpunitive view of con
tract breachers. lo4 Professor Robert A. Hillman stressed the
economic and other benefits of encouraging parties to "hold the
102. Id. at 1120-22 (noting, however, that limit will be "practicable only when
the victim's performance consists of the payment of money or perhaps the transfer
of some other divisible, fungible units of goods or services" and explaining that
breaching party's interest will be subject to good faith of victim in determining
reasonable estimate of damages).
103. Id. at 1116-22.
104. The nonpunitive view of contract breach is best reflected in the concept
of efficient breach, i.e., the view that as long as the nonbreaching party is fully
compensated and the breaching party is better off, a breach of contract should be
encouraged, not discouraged, in order to promote the most efficient use of assets.
See, e.g., Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 273, 284-86 (1970) (discussing efficient breach the
ory). Professor Birmingham argued that:
Repudiation of obligations should be encouraged where the promisor is
able to profit from his default after placing his promisee in as good a
position as he would have occupied had performance been rendered .
. . . To penalize such adjustments through overcompensation of the in
nocent party is to discourage efficient reallocation of community re
sources. . . . Rigidity resulting from thus binding a party to his
undertaking limits the factor and product mobility essential to proper
functioning of the market mechanism.
Id. at 284-85. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 4.8, at
117-26 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing fundamental principles of contract damages and
explaining that it makes difference in deciding which remedy to grant whether
breach is efficient).
This theory has been scrutinized by many scholars and has been convincingly
criticized for its failure to account for the transaction costs involved in any contract
dispute. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory
Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REv. 1443 (1980) (arguing that efficient
breach model based on compensatory damages is flawed because it fails to con
sider adequately transaction costs incurred in breach of contract, including rene
gotiation and litigation as well as cost of undetected inefficient breaches, which
add to costs without increasing quality of efficiency); Daniel Friedmann, The Effi
cient Breach Fallacy, 18]. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989) (asserting that efficient breach the
ory fails to consider transaction costs and other uncertainties which result from
breach of contract and advantages in some situations of encouraging transactions
between nonbreaching party and third party who has provided impetus for
breach); Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REv.
947,957 (1982) ("Whether an expectation damages rule or a specific performance
rule is more efficient depends entirely upon the relative transaction costs of oper
ating under the rules. . . . None of the transaction costs can be deduced by use of
the microeconomic model, but can only be determined inductively from empirical
evidence.") .
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deal together."lo5 He discussed the law's attempt to balance the
rights of the nonbreaching party with the goals of economic effi
ciency and avoidance of waste. 106 As described by Professor Hill
man, contract law seeks to avoid waste by enforcing rules of
mitigation, that is, that the nonbreaching party cannot act in ways
that will needlessly increase the damages caused by the breach of
Others have gone beyond the flaws in the theory with respect to economics to
criticize its failure to account for the moral value of keeping promises as well as the
general societal benefits that flow from the ability to rely on others to live up to
their promises. See, e.g., Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Effi
ciency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 111 (1981) (arguing
that theories of efficient breach fail to consider noncommercial and idiosyncratic
values that people place on contract performance and ignore moral basis underly
ing contracts and asserting that courts should instead rely on remedy of specific
performance to promote fair and efficient results); Patricia H. Marschall, Willful
ness: A Crucial Factqr in Choosing Remedies for Breach of Contract, 24 ARIz. L. REv. 733
(1982) (arguing that efficient breach theory is faulty and courts should not allow
willful breacher to profit from his or her breach). Professor Marschall explained
that: "Even if the theory of efficient breach were realistic, the values that support it
are of less importance to society than the principle of good faith and fair dealing
in the performance and enforcement of contracts." [d. at 734. Thus, Professor
Marschall asserted that: "Courts ought to be putting more emphasis on the notion
of sanctity of contract and the resulting moral obligation to honor one's
promises." [d. at 740; see also RussellJ. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and
Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1, 30-35 (finding in survey of corporate practice that there
is substantial sentiment among corporate counsel that even in the absence of ac
tual reliance, contractual commitment should be enforced).
Professor Friedmann also questions the notion underlying the efficient
breach theory that one has a right to breach a contract. Friedmann, supra, at 13-18.
He asserts that throughout property and tort law, the law rejects this notion by
protecting a party's entitlement to his or her property and the interests in it cre
ated by contracts. [d.; see also Macneil, supra, at 961-69 (arguing that efficient
breach theory ignores fact that party's entitlement to rewards of contract is not
determined separately from remedy granted for breach of contract). Professor
Macneil states that "there is no a priori basis for selecting any particular time or
event for determining that the transaction is closed," and only then does the party
have a new property right which may be protected by more than ordinary contract
remedies. Id. at 964.
Furthermore, others have pointed to and supported the increased willingness
of courts to grant punitive damages for breach of contract. See, e.g., Marschall,
supra, at 758-60 (determining that punitive damages should be used to deter willful
breaches of contract); Timothy J. Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract:
The Reality and Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REv. 207 (1977) (discussing
judicial decisions that blurred distinction between tort and contract law in regard
to punitive damages); Randy L. Sassaman, Note, Punitive Damages in Contract Ac
tions-Are the Exceptions Swallowing the Rule?, 20 WASHBURN LJ. 86, 104-05 (1980)
(concluding that "better rule would allow punitive damages based on the quality of
defendants' conduct, without regard to the rigid tort-contract dichotomy").
105. Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together, supra note 26, at 556-58 (noting that it
has been suggested that contract breach penalties would deter contract formation
and therefore would run counter to purposes of contract remedies) .
. 106. [d. at 558-61 (discussing avoidable consequences doctrine). For a fur
ther discussion of the avoidable consequences doctrine, see infra notes 107-11 and
accompanying text.
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contract. I07 The nonbreaching party is required to take steps to
make substitute arrangements with third parties, when reasonable,
that will reduce the damages caused by the breach; for example, a
wrongfully discharged employee cannot sit idle and seek recovery
of all lost wages if reasonably comparable work is available.108 Ac
cording to Professor Hillman, such rules are desirable because they
avoid economic waste. I09
Professor Hillman would extend this notion of avoiding waste
even further by requiring the nonbreaching party to accept a post
breach modification offer from the breaching party in situations
that will avoid harm to the breaching party without increasing the
costs to the nonbreaching party. I 10 Thus, where there are no other
reasonable substitutes for the nonbreaching party and the breach
ing party's offer is reasonable and does not waive the nonbreaching
party's rights to sue for the breach of the original contract, the non
breaching party must accept the breaching party's offer under the
rules of mitigation. II I Professor Hillman argues that to allow the
nonbreaching party to reject such offers and to cancel the contract
is inconsistent with the economic, nonpunitive view of contract
law. 112 He thus recognized that material breach doctrine, as cur107. Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together, supra note 26, at 558-59.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 559-61 (noting that mitigation rules should not conflict with expec
tancy theory). Professor Hillman states that "the main purpose of the doctrine [of
avoidable consequences] is to avoid economic waste which would result from the
injured party suffering damages from the breach which could have been avoided
by reasonable efforts." Id.
110. Id. Hillman states:
Under the rule of avoidable consequences, the injured party must, when
reasonable, make substitute agreements with third parties to avoid loss
from the breach. The extent to which the injured party must deal with
the breaching party to avoid loss is less clear. ... In many instances it may
be economically reasonable for the injured party to avoid waste by ac
cepting a new offer made by the breaching party.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
111. Id. For a further discussion of the rule of avoidable consequences, see
supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
112. Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together, supra note 26, at 598-615. Professor
Hillman also discussed the law's interest in balancing the harm to the breaching
party in the event of termination with the harm to the nonbreaching party. Hill
man, Analysis of Cessation, supra note 3, at 634-37, 656-57. Other scholars have also
focused on the need to provide the breaching party with an opportunity to cure
the breach and on the need to protect the breaching party from unduly harsh
consequences, such as forfeiture. See Lawrence, supra note 53, at 724-25 (stressing
that providing breaching party with opportunity to cure its breach is best justified
by "general contract remedial principles of protecting expectations and avoiding
waste of resources, while also protecting the breaching party against forfeiture of
its contract rights" (footnote omitted)). Professor Lawrence asserts that encourag
ing the breaching party to cure its breach and the nonbreaching party to facilitate
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rently applied, interferes with the goal of "holding the deal to
gether" by allowing the non breaching party simply to terminate the
contract in response to a material breach. 113 His view would conand accept that cure will most effectively promote society's interests in economic
efficiency. See id. at 724-35 (encouraging avoidance of waste). He further ob
serves, however, that although the Second Restatement incorporated the concept
of cure by making only an uncured material failure a condition to the other party's
duty to perform, the awkward drafting of § 237 makes it likely that courts will con
tinue to neglect this notion of cure. Id. at 735-44; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 237 (1979) (discussing effect of other party's duties of failure to
render performance).
This view is also reflected in the approach of Article 2 of the Vniform Com
mercial Code (VCC) to the problem of the seller's tender of nonconforming
goods. For example, although a buyer is entitled to reject nonconforming goods,
Article 2 requires the buyer to give notice to the seller of such rejection and re
quires that the buyer reject within a reasonable time after tender or delivery of
such nonconforming goods. V.C.C. §§ 2-601 (a), 2-602(1). In addition, and most
significantly, Article 2 provides the seller with an opportunity to cure, i.e., to
tender conforming goods. Id. § 2-508. Although there are limitations on this op
portunity to cure, the VCC's drafters clearly intended to increase the likelihood
that parties could resolve their own disputes without resorting to litigation by re
quiring the buyer to provide the seller with notice of rejection and by allowing the
seller some opportunity to cure the defect in its original tender. Thus, the drafters
of the VCC wanted to encourage communications between the parties in order to
facilitate independent resolution of such disputes. For a more complete discus
sion of the VCC's treatment of problems of contract performance and breach, see
Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together, supra note 26, at 579-94; Lawrence, supra note
53, at 718-20; John A. Sebert, Jr., Rejection, Revocation and Cure Under Article 2 o/the
Uniform Commercial Code: Some Modest Proposals, 84 Nw. V. L. REv. 375, 376 (1990)
(recommending revisions for Article 2). For a comparision of the VCC's perfect
tender rule and the common law standard of substantial performance, see Ramirez
v. Autosport, 440 A.2d 1345, 1348-52 (NJ. 1982).
As defined by Professor Richard Craswell, the most efficient termination rule
is one that prevents a promisee from terminating the contract "whenever that
promisee will be fully compensated if the promisor's attempt to perform should
fail." Richard Craswell, Insecurity, Repudiation, and Cure, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 430
(1990). Where such compensation is not certain, e.g., where the promisor is not
solvent or where damages are too uncertain, then the promisee should be allowed
to terminate the contract in response to a repudiation or breach by the promisor
unless "(I) the promisee's uncertainty about the promisor's performance is no
greater than it was when the original contract was signed,"-that is, where the
promisee had information about the risks at the time it entered the contract-or
"(2) even successful performance has become undesirable for the promisee,"
that is, where the promisee's reasons for terminating are based on the fact that the
contract, even iffully performed by the promisor, is no longer as valuable or desir
able as originally assumed by the promisee. Id. In sum, Craswell recognizes that
termination may sometimes be the most efficient alternative, but concludes that
current rules based on material breach do not reflect the most appropriate rule for
determining when termination will be efficient. Id.
113. Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together, supra note 26, at 562-64. Hillman
states: 'The material breach doctrine would lead to harsh results if an insignificant
breach were interpreted to deprive the injured party of 'substantially what he bar
gained for.'" Id. at 562. Hillman added that factors that should be considered in
distinguishing a material breach from an immaterial breach normally help protect
against harsh results where justice and common sense require. Id. at 563. "Never
theless, the material breach doctrine often leads to unjust results." Id.
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sider the hann to the breaching party by limiting the nonbreaching
party's right of tennination in cases where the hann to the breach
ing party if the contract is tenninated outweighs the hann to the
nonbreaching party that is caused by the breach.1I4
Professor Arthur 1. Rosett viewed this problem from a different
perspective. 1I5 He argued that the underlying problem with con
tract law's treatment of the issues that arise in contract disputes is
that the law has been shaped to guide courts rendering decisions in
cases that have gone to litigation. 116 Instead, according to Profes
sor Rosett, contract law should attempt to guide the private parties
to resolve those contract disputes by themselves. 117 He asserts that
"since the parties are in a better position than courts to detennine
what to do, they would be best served by rules which encourage
them to solve the problem themselves."1I8 For Professor Rosett,
this would mean imposing a duty on the nonbreaching party to of
fer the breaching party an opportunity to cure before a court would
allow the discharge of the nonbreaching party's contractual obliga
tions. II9 Such a duty, according to Professor Rosett, would increase
the likelihood that the parties would resolve the matter
themselves. 120
What underlies Professors Hillman's and Rosett's views is a fun
damental belief that society and the parties to contracts would ben
efit from independent resolutions of contract disputes that do not
involve the COUrts. I21 Moreover, there is an implicit, if not explicit,
114. [d.

115. Rosett, supra note I, at 1083-1102 (discussing contract performance and
shortcomings of traditional theories of remedy).
116. [d. at 1085.
117. [d. at 1085, 1096-98.
118. [d. at 1098.
119. [d. at 1100.
120. [d. at 1100-02 (making similar point regarding law's role in encouraging
communications and independent resolutions of dispute after partial repudiation
of contract); see also Arthur Rosett, Partial, Qualified and Equivocal Repudiation of
Contract, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 93, 110 (1981) (trying to promote settlement without
court intervention).
121. See Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together, supra note 26, at 614 n.269 (observ
ing that "[c]ontracting parties seek to avoid litigation. Since the law should at
tempt to formulate its rules in accordance with actual business practices, a policy
that spurs settlement is desired." (citations omitted». Professor Hillman's obser
vation was confirmed by Professor Weintraub in his survey of actual contract prac
tice, in which he found that the overwhelming majority of respondents would
grant a request for modification of a contract, especially if it was reasonable or if
there was a satisfactory pre-existing relationship with the other party. Weintraub,
supra note 104, at 18-21. The survey also showed that most companies had at some
time requested a contractual modification from another party to a contract. [d. at
22-24. Weintraub concluded that the survey demonstrated that "when trouble oc-
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assumption that disappointing the reasonable expectations of the
nonbreaching party does not itself justify terminating the contract.
The impact on the breaching party is also significant and must be
considered, whether for reasons of economic efficiency, as articu
lated by Professor Hillman, or for reasons of fairness and auton
omy, as articulated by Professor Rosett.1 22 Thus, as had been
identified by Judge Cardozo, the second factor that must be consid
ered when determining material breach is the harshness of the ef
fect that termination will have on the breaching party.123 A
nonbreaching party's right to terminate in response to the breach
ing party's failure to perform is not simply a function of the non
breaching party's own disappointed expectations, but also is
affected by the degree of harm that termination will inflict on the
breaching party.
A focus just on Judge Cardozo's first two factors could lead,
however, to nothing more than a formulaic balancing test: Does the
harm caused by the breach to the nonbreaching party's reasonable
expectations outweigh the harm that will be suffered by the breach
ing party if the contract is terminated? In order to avoid such a
mechanical approach, it is necessary to incorporate Judge Car
dozo's third factor into the analysis: good faith.124 It is that factor
which seems critical and yet, is the one that courts have paid the
least attention.
V.

THE SOLUTION: ACKNOWLEDGING THE CRITICAL ROLE OF
GoOD FAITH

When considering a possible improvement in the law of mate
rial breach, it is first necessary to state certain assumptions about
the way parties behave. We can assume that some disputes are
curs respondents were more likely to experience accommodation and compromise
than to become involved in litigation." [d. at 51-52 (citations omitted); see also
Geller, supra note 5, at 198 (arguing that improved standard to determine propri
ety of one party's withholding of payment upon another party's contractual breach
should encourage parties to resolve their differences through communication, ne
gotiation and settlement rather than through costly, risky process of litigation).
122. For a discussion of Hillman's and Rosett's opinions, see supra notes 11020 and accompanying text.
123. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921) ("We
must weigh the purpose to be served, the desire to be gratified, the excuse for
deviation from the letter, the cruelty of enforced adherence." (emphasis added».
124. See id. (explaining that "willful transgressor must accept the penalty of
his transgression" while transgressor "whose default is unintentional and trivial
may hope for mercy if he will offer atonement for his wrong." (citations omitted».
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"good faith" disputes and that some are "bad faith" disputes. 125
Professors Burton and Andersen assert that when parties enter a
contract, their intentions and reasonable expectations define the
parameters for their conduct in performing and enforcing the con
tract. 126 These intentions and expectations are considered by Bur
ton and Andersen to create "the world of the contract." 127
Determinations of breach then must be made based on the "world
of the contract."128 A failure to perform as promised must be evalu
ated based on whether it can be justified on the basis of this "world
of the contract"; that is, on the basis of the intentions and reason
able expectations of the parties as to what would justify a failure to
perform. 129
In the terminology used here, a "bad faith" dispute is one that
is not based on the "world of the contract" because it conflicts with
those actual intentions and expectations; a "good faith" dispute re
flects the party's actual intentions and reasonable expectations.I 30
Where the parties both honestly believe that they are right, for ex125. V.C.C. § 1-201(19). The VCC defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in
the conduct or transaction concerned." Id. When concerning merchants, the
VCC provides a definition of "good faith" to mean "honesty in fact and the obser
vance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." Id. § 2103(I)(b).
126. Burton & Andersen, supra note 1, at 862-69.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 867-69.
129. Id. at 862-69.
130. See Steven]. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform
in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REv. 369, 385-87 (defining "good faith" as based on
reasonable expectations of parties with respect to how each party would behave).
Professor Burton also stated that:
The good faith performance doctrine may be said to permit the exercise
of discretion for any purpose-including ordinary business purposes
reasonably within the contemplation of the parties. A contract would
thus be breached by a failure to perform in good faith if a party uses its
discretion for a reason outside the reasonable contemplated range-a
reason beyond the risks assumed by the party claiming a breach.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Burton further elaborated on this view in a subsequent article, asserting that:
"The good faith performance doctrine is used to effectuate the intentions of the
parties, or to protect their reasonable expectations, through interpretation and
implication." Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply
to Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REv. 497, 499 (1984).
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to explore fully the best ap
proach for defining good faith, scholars have often discussed the concept of "good
faith" and have developed differing views on how to define "good faith." For ex
ample, Professor Robert Summers argued that it is best to define "good faith" by
considering what conduct would not be good faith conduct. Robert S. Summers,
"Good Faith n in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 201 (1968). That is, he thought good faith should be
defined by what it excludes:
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ample, where Owner honestly believes he or she is entitled to the
correct brand of pipe and really cares that this brand be used and
Contractor honestly believes that the pipe used is correct and that
any change would unfairly increase the cost of the contract, we have
a "good faith" dispute. lSI On the other hand, if either party is act
ing in bad faith, for example, if Owner is using the pipe problem as
a pretext for harassing Contractor to extract some financial conces
sion or to escape its contractual obligations,ls2 or if Contractor has
It is a phrase without general meaning (or meanings) of its own and
serves to exclude a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith. In a
particular context the phrase takes on specific meaning, but usually this is
only by way of contrast with the specific form of bad faith actually or
hypothetically ruled out.
Id. (footnote omitted). In a later article discussing § 205 of the Second Restate
ment and its recognition that "[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of
good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement," Professor Sum
mers again asserted the benefits of the "excluder" approach to defining "good
faith." Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Con
ceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 810, 824 (1982) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979». He argued:
My view is that all ... efforts [by other scholars] to define good faith, for
purposes of a section like 205, are misguided. Such formulations provide
very little, if any, definitional guidance .... Finally, the very idea of good
faith, if! am right, is simply notthe kind of idea that is susceptible of such
a definitional approach.
Id. at 829-30.
It would seem that the more the courts are forced to consider the concept of
good faith, in the coritext of material breach decisions as well as in other aspects of
contract formation and performance, the better will be our understanding of that
concept and the best way to define it.
131. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 890 (N.Y. 1921) (discuss
ing dispute over pipes).
132. See, e.g., T. Ferguson Constr. v. Sealaska Corp., 820 P.2d 1058 (Alaska 1991)
(illustrating issue of pretextual assertion of other party's material breach as justifi
cation for one's own nonperformance). In that case, the plaintiff had entered into
a road construction contract with the defendant, but immediately fell behind
schedule due to its inadequate equipment and financial resources. Id. at 1058-59.
Five months after entering the initial contract, the parties modified the construc
tion contract to resolve certain disputes concerning the interpretation of the pay
ment clause and to reflect that, to date, the defendant had paid the plaintiff more
than it was owed. Id. at 1059. The modification also specified dates for payment
of certain cash advances to plaintiff for work still to be done. Id. One month
later, disputes arose again. Id. at 1059-60. The plaintiff called to ask if the defend
ant had mailed the cash advance due that day, and although the defendant said
that it had been mailed, the advance had not gone out due to a holiday. Id. at
1059. There was also a disagreement regarding how much was owed. Id. at 105960. On the following day, the defendant inspected the work sites, and finding that
the plaintiff was not performing any work, decided to withhold payment. Id. at
1060. The plaintiff then stopped work and sued the defendant for alleged breach
based on the defendant's failure to make the payment that was allegedly due. Id.
The trial court found that the defendant was not in breach and was excused
from making further payment because it acted on the correct belief that the plain
tiff was unable to perform. Id. at 1061-62. Rather, the trial court held that the
plaintiff was in breach by its failure to perform after having not received payment
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used the wrong pipe to save money, knowing that it was not what
was the contract required, we have a "bad faith" dispute. 133
AB the law currently stands, little, if any, express attention is
paid to the good or bad faith nature of the breach. Although there
is some scholarly support for the notion of deterring willful
breaches 134 and some weight placed on willfulness in some determifrom the defendant. [d. at 1062. The trial court awarded damages to the defend
ant in an amount that reflected payments made to the plaintiff in excess of work
done, plus extra costs incurred by the defendant to complete the job. [d. at 1060
n.6.
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing with the factual findings of the
trial court and its conclusion that defendant was justified to withhold the payment.
[d. at 1061-62. Two judges dissented, asserting that the defendant had not with
held the payment because of the inability or failure of the plaintiff to complete the
job. [d. at 1063-64 (Matthews,J., dissenting). The dissent found evidence that the
defendant had withheld payment for other reasons. [d. at 1064 (Matthews,]., dis
senting). The dissent concluded: "Withholding of progress payments is justified
only if the withholding party actually relies on the circumstances which clearly
warrant that action." [d. (Matthews, J., dissenting). In other words, the dissent
believed that the defendant was not motivated by plaintiffs failure to perform, but
had other reasons for withholding, including the lapse of plaintiffs performance
bonds and the fact that plaintiff would have owed defendant money if the progress
payment had been made. [d. at 1064, n.1 (Matthews,]., dissenting); see also Com
monwealth Petroleum Co. v. Billings, 759 P.2d 736, 740 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987)
(finding party's objection to form of assignment of lease to be "mere 'after
thought' used improperly" to claim material breach and holding use of wrong
form was not material breach). But see Refinement Int'l Co. v. Eastbourne N.V.,
815 F. Supp. 738, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Since [defendant] had the legal right to
terminate its obligation under the contract, it is legally irrelevant whether [defend
ant] was also motivated by reasons which would not themselves constitute valid
grounds for termination of the contract."), affd, 25 F.3d 105 (2d. Cir. 1994).
133. See, e.g., UHS-Qualicare, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Community Hosp., 525 So. 2d
746, 747 (Miss. 1987) (illustrating bad faith dispute). In UHS-Qualicare, the plain
tiff was both a 50% owner and the management company of the defendant hospi
tal. [d. When the plaintiff, in its capacity of manager, raised the daily rate for the
hospital without approval of the hospital board, the hospital terminated plaintiffs
management contract, claiming material breach. [d. at 748-49. This termination
occurred after the other 50% owner had gained control of the board. [d. at 749.
The court refused to uphold the finding of material breach and thus the defend
ant's right to termination, concluding that the defendant always reserved the
power to override the rate increase. [d. at 757. The court, concluding that the
defendant could not assert the rate increases as a material breach when it had the
power to reverse those increases, said: "Today's horse ... was completely subject to
the reins and whip of its master who was obligated to at least try to exercise its
authority before declaring termination." [d. The court found it particularly telling
that defendant had still not rolled back the hospital's rates after terminating plain
tiff as evidence of the insincerity of defendant's claim of material breach. [d.; see
also Kershentsev v. Mascotte Prods., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 339, 352 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(holding that booking agent's contract with ballet troupe was materially breached
by: agent's failure to keep adequate records, lying, refusal to render accounting,
failure to procure bookings, loss offunds and improper incorporation), rev'd, 981
F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1992).
134. See, e.g., Marschall, supra note 104, at 734 (arguing that any party who
commits "willful breach" of contract should be subject to punitive damages). Pro-
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nations of material breach,135 the law generally treats contract
breach as an amoral matter with economic consequences for which
there should be compensation, but not punishment. 136 If, instead,
the courts focused on the character of the breach and determined
rights and remedies accordingly, the law might be able to en
courage good faith conduct and independent resolution of con
tract disputes.
fessor Marschall would define a "willful breach" as "a knowing breach by a party
not legally excused from performing, which is made for any primary purpose other
than to confer a benefit on the aggrieved party." Id. at 733; see also Frank]. Cavico,
Jr., Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract-A Principled Approach, 22 ST. MARY'S LJ.
357, 375 (1990) ("The orthodox rule [of compensatory damages for breach of
contract], which continually downplays or disregards the wrongfulness of the
breaching party's conduct regardless of how outrageously immoral, offends one's
sense of fairness and justice and engenders disrespect for the law.").
135. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241(e) (defining one factor
to be used to determine whether material failure has occurred is "the extent to
which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer to perform comports
with standards of good faith and fair dealing"). This factor has led courts to place
some weight on the character of the breaching party's conduct in determining
material breach and substantial performance. See Malone v. United States, 849
F.2d 1441, 1445-46 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (considering government's bad faith factor in
finding that it had materially breached contract with painter where government
had failed to notify painter that work was unsatisfactory until 70% of work was
completed and had otherwise misled painter into believing work was approved);
Eastbourne, 815 F. Supp. at 743 (upholding defendant's termination of contract
with plaintiff where plaintiff unable to assert substantial performance, in part due
to finding that its breach "was neither unintentional nor trivial, but clearly a willful
breach ofa material term of the contract"); Vincenzi v. Cerro, 442 A.2d 1352, 1354
(Conn. 1982) (reasoning that willfulness not solely determinative, but just one fac
tor to be weighed in determining whether contractor had substantially performed
and was therefore entitled to recover under contract); RJ. Berke & Co. v.J.P. Grif
fin, Inc., 367 A.2d 583, 586 (N.H. 1976) (holding that although willful breacher
ordinarily denied even quantum meruit recovery, award to subcontractor upheld
based on finding of no bad faith on its part); Kiriakides v. United Artists Commu
nications, Inc., 440 S.E.2d 364, 367 (S.C. 1994) (considering tenant's good faith in
immediately tendering amount due upon receiving actual notice of rent increase
as factor in finding no material breach of lease); see also Andersen, supra note 54, at
1124-28 (discussing willful breach as relevant factor to issue of materiality and in
terest in future performance); Marschall, supra note 104, at 736 (noting that will
fulness factor pervades Second Restatement, despite some American Law Institute
support for efficient breach).
Similarly, in the parallel doctrine of substantial performance, weight is some
times placed on the willfulness of the breach in determining if the breaching party
has failed to perform substantially. See 3A CORBIN, supra note 19, § 707, at 329
(noting that when cases deny recovery to plaintiff on ground that breach was will
ful, it is "probable that his breach was actually such as to prevent his performance
from being 'substantial'" ); 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 8.12, at 418 (explaining
that concept of substantial forfeiture "evolved in response to the risk of foreiture");
Farber, supra note 104, at 1470-73 (discussing willfulness element of substantial
performance). For a discussion of the doctrine of substantial performance, see
supra note 51 and accompanying text.
136. For a discussion of the compensatory nature of contract law, see supra
note 104 and accompanying text.
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Thus, if we assume that a dispute arises like that in Jacob &
Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,137 when determining material breach by the
Contractor, the court should first weigh the harm to the two par
ties: Is the harm to Owner's reasonable expectations greater than
the harm to Contractor if Owner terminates the contract? If one
assumes that Contractor had used an equivalent pipe, then it would
seem that the harm to Owner should be weighed less heavily than
the harm to Contractor, assuming Contractor has not been paid.
On the other hand, if the pipe used was not equivalent, then the
balance of harms might tip the other way. In many cases, the harm
to the parties may be fairly closely balanced.
Having identified the relative balance of harms, the court
should then consider the factor of good faith and add that to the
scale before deciding if the Contractor has committed a material
breach. Although the good faith of a breaching party may not be
enough to counterbalance any substantial harm to the nonbreach
ing party, it will playa critical role in those cases where the harm to
the parties is more or less balanced. Thus, in those cases where
each party will suffer similarly significant harm, if the other party
does not complete its performance of the contract, the relative
good faith of those parties will be the deciding factor for the courts
to rely on in determining material breach and the appropriate out
come and remedies.
When both parties are operating in good faith, the law should
act to encourage these parties to work out the matter among them
selves by finding no material breach and thus refusing to sanction
the termination of the contract by the nonbreaching party. The
court should recognize the concerns each party may have as it ne
gotiates with each other and not simply deny protection to the first
breacher.
For example, if Contractor honestly believed that he was al
lowed to use the pipe installed and Owner honestly believed other
wise and she is honestly concerned about Contractor's future
performance, there is a reasonable likelihood that these two parties
can work out their differences independently. Both parties still can
see some benefit from working together and both are operating
137. 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921) (known as the "Reading Pipe Case"). InJacob
& Youngs. the plaintiff built a country residence for defendant. [d. at 890. The
contract called for the use of "standard pipe" of "Reading manufacture." [d. The
plaintiff used pipe that was not manufactured by Reading. [d. The court ruled
that the omission was not willful and that replacement of the pipe would be ex
tremelyexpensive. [d. The court thus found that the use of non-Reading pipe was
insignificant. [d.
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honestly and in good faith. Each, however, may have legitimate
worries. Contractor may have two concerns: one, whether he will
be paid for the work already done if he breaks off the relationship;
and two, whether he will be paid for any future work if he continues
working. Owner similarly will have two types of concerns: one,
whether Contractor will perform the rest of the work to Owner's
satisfaction; and two, whether there will be some correction of or
compensation for the error already committed. I38
As described by Professor Andersen, each party will be con
cerned about both the risks of future performance and the desire
for compensation for past performance. I39 Professor Andersen ar
gued that a party's right to suspend performance should be deter
mined on the basis of the party's concerns for future
performance. I4O Although it is easier to sympathize with a party's
desire to suspend performance when that party has serious con
cerns about the other's future performance, in good faith disputes,
both parties may have legitimate concerns about the other's future
performance. It seems arbitrary and wasteful to focus only on who
breached first and to allow for termination by the nonbreaching
party as the parties may still be able to work together.
138. Many have commented on the role that nonlegal factors play in deter
ring breach and facilitating resolution of disputes. There is much sociological and
economic literature on the subject of nonlegal factors that encourage parties to
honor commitments. See, e.g., David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Rela
tionships, 104 HARv. L. REv. 373, nn.59-82 (1990) (discussing the reasons for and
consequences of commercial parties often relying on such nonlegal sanctions in
stead of legally enforceable agreements). Professor Charny describes three gen
eral categories of nonlegal sanctions that discourage breach of commitment: the
loss of relationship-specific prospective advantages, such as future dealings with
the other party or collateral posted as security; the injury to reputation among
other market participants; and the damage to psychic and social goods, such as
self-esteem and social acceptance. /d. at 392-97. Professor Farnsworth theorized
that nonlegal sanctions are more effective in relationships that are reversible, i.e.,
relationships where the parties realize that each could be in the other's position,
e.g., in market transactions between equals. E. Allan Farnsworth, The Past of Prom
ise: An Historical Introduction to Contract, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 576, 604-05 (1969). He
further pointed out that such nonlegal sanctions are more effective in continuing
relationships, as opposed to one-shot deals. Id.; see also Addison Mueller, Contract
Remedies: Business Fact and Legal Fantasy, 1967 WIS. L. REv. 833, 836 (noting that "it
is nonlegal sanctions, not 'the law,' that keep contracts from being breached in
most standard dealings between parties"); Weintraub, supra note 104, at 20 (find
ing in survey researching actual contract practice, that "[w]hen a dispute arises,
parties with a history of mutually beneficial dealings are less likely to resort to
litigation than are strangers" (footnote omitted».
139. See Andersen, supra note 54, at 1092 (discussing expectation interests of
contracting parties).
140. Id. at 1092, 1096-1101. For a further discussion of Professor Andersen's
views, see supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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In this circumstance, the court should find no material breach.
The law should seek to encourage these parties to negotiate rather
than to allow one party'to suspend performance simply because the
other party breached first. Some have argued that the best way for
the law to facilitate such negotiations is to deny monetary relief to
either party if the dispute ends in litigation. Instead, these scholars
argue, the courts should order specific performance. 141 By doing
so, the court will require the parties to reconsider their positions
and either perform as originally agreed or modify the agreement to
fit their changed perceptions and circumstances.
This solution may work satisfactorily with respect to two good
faith parties. The knowledge that if the matter goes to litigation
they will simply be ordered to perform may keep these parties at
the negotiating table. Thus, if the balance of harms is relatively
close and the parties are operating in good faith, neither party
should be entitled to suspend or terminate the contract. In other
words, no material breach should be found in these cases.
Such an approach, however, may be less effective if one party is
not acting in good faith. When there is a bad faith breach on the
part of one party, there may be little the law can do to encourage a
fair independent settlement. By definition, that party is seeking to
avoid its contractual obligations. Rather than treating such a
breach as "acceptable" and awarding only compensatory damages
to the nonbreaching party, the law's goal should be to deter parties
from bad faith breaches by penalizing the breaching party. Thus, if
a party is found to have breached in bad faith and the harm to the
nonbreaching party outweighs the harm to the breaching party if
the contract is terminated, that breach should be considered mate
rial. The court should then deny the breaching party any remedy,
including restitution for work done, and stJ.ould moreover hold that
party liable to the other party for its expectation damages.

141. See, e.g., Robert L. Birmingham, Damage Measures and Economic Rationality:
The Geometry of Contract Law, 1969 DUKE LJ. 49, 70 ("The availability of the remedy
of specific performance might permit achievement of the desired result without
the expense of court action by encouraging one contemplating breach to bargain
instead to adjust his duties."); Linzer, supra note 104, at 138 ("By holding the par
ties to their bargain, but permitting them to negotiate out, specific performance
lets no outsiders substitute their values for those of the parties. Except in the most
fungible of commercial transactions, courts should encourage this self-regulating
and thus more efficient method of valuation and dispute resolution."); Macneil,
supra note 104, at 959 (asserting that specific performance is more likely to en
courage "consultation and mutually beneficial agreement," leading to more effi
cient result overall).
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For example, if Contractor is found to be operating in bad
faith by deliberately using the wrong pipe to save expenses, and the
harm to the Owner outweighs or equals the harm to Contractor
from termination of the contract, then Contractor has committed a
material breach.142 Owner should then be able to recover her dam
ages and to suspend performance, based on her good faith con
cerns about Contractor's future performance. These damages
should include the increased cost of completing the job and any
additional expenses incurred. To the extent that Owner benefits
from the work Contractor had already done, that benefit will be
recognized by awarding only the increase in the cost of completion
to the Owner as damages. Contractor, however, will have no sepa
rate claim for restitution. Thus, by penalizing the bad faith party
and rewarding the good faith party in such disputes, the law can
discourage bad faith breaches and perhaps reduce the likelihood of
such disputes.
Similarly, the nonbreaching party may be seeking a discharge
from its obligations by relying in bad faith on the other party's de
fective performance. Thus, if, for example, Contractor breaches in
good faith by mistakenly using the wrong pipe, and Owner is found
to be using the pipe problem in bad faith to extract concessions
from Contractor or to avoid the contract completely, a court should
not consider the Contractor's breach material. Here, Contractor
has not acted in bad faith and the harm to Owner was not signifi
cant and did not actually raise legitimate concerns about future
performance. Thus, Owner had no right to terminate, and by fail
ing to perform in bad faith, should be liable to Contractor for dam
ages. Owner should be liable to Contractor for any lost profit that
Contractor had expected to make on the contract, less any costs
Contractor has avoided by the termination of the contract. The
court should also include any additional costs Contractor has in
curred as a result of the dispute in the damages Contractor may
recover from Owner. It should not matter that Contractor failed to
perform first, if his nonperformance was in good faith.143
142. See Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 891 (discussing breach).
143. In Bernstein v. Nemeyer, 570 A.2d 164 (Conn. 1990), the Connecticut
Supreme Court took an approach which reflects- these concerns. Plaintiffs had
entered into a limited partnership agreement with defendants which all parties
knew involved substantial financial risk. [d. at 165. As part of the agreement, de
fendants promised to loan money to the partnership to cover any negative cash
flow. [d. at 165-66. The properties in which the partnership had invested failed to
appreciate and eventually the mortgagees foreclosed on the properties. [d. at 166.
All the parties lost their investment. [d. Defendants had failed to perform the
negative cash flow guarantee completely and plaintiffs sued, alleging material
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If both parties are failing to perform for bad faith reasons, the
courts should treat the parties as equally responsible for the dis
pute. The appropriate remedy is then to place both parties in a
position where both lose the benefits of the contract. If, for exam
ple, in our pipe hypothetical, Contractor used the wrong pipe in
bad faith to save money and Owner asserted the use of the wrong
pipe pretextually to stop payments to Contractor when, in fact, the
brand of pipe did not matter to her, then both parties were acting
in bad faith. Neither party should be "entitled" to suspend or ter
minate the contract because both are responsible for the break
down in contractual relations. Thus, no material breach should be
found.
Instead, if some of the work had been done by Contractor, and
some of the price had been paid by Owner, then Owner should
fully pay for the work done but only at the actual cost to Contractor.
Contractor should not be able to recover any lost profits or other
reliance damages. Owner should not be entitled to recover for
completion costs or its reliance damages. By limiting the available
remedies, the court may be placing the parties where they would
have been if they could have successfully settled the matter them
selves. If contracting parties are aware of these limited remedies,
this may deter bad faith breaches or, at least, increase the incentives
for the parties to work the matter out by themselves.
breach and seeking rescission and restitution of the money invested in the partner
ship. Id. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that although the breach was mate
rial because of the importance of the guaranty, the defendants had not acted in
bad faith and had not been unjustly enriched by that breach. Id. at 170. Given the
character of the breach as distinguished from its materiality, the court concluded
that the defendants were not liable to the plaintiffs for restitution and that the
material breach had merely discharged the plaintiff's contractual obligation. Id. at
168-69. Thus, the court recognized that remedies should be adjusted to reflect the
character of a breach, not simply its materiality. Id. at 168-70; see also Milner Ho
tels, Inc. v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 822 F. Supp. 341, 347 (S.D.W. Va. 1993) (deter
mining that party who commits material breach is not entitled to recover rent
payment where other party vacated premises as result of such breach), aff'd, 19
F.3d 1429 (4th Cir. 1994); Argentinis v. Gould, 592 A.2d 378,381-82 (Conn. 1991)
(holding that where contractor did not substantially perform contract to build
house, owner is entitled to recover compensatory damages to cover costs of com
pletion and repairs less any unpaid portion of contract price; however, contractor
cannot sue for unpaid contract price if it has not substantially performed); RJ.
Berke & Co. v. J.P. Griffin, Inc., 367 A.2d 583, 586-87 (N.H. 1976) (upholding
quantum meruit recovery to subcontractor who had not substantially performed
where both parties to construction contract had materially breached); Kiriakides v.
United Artists Communications, Inc., 440 S.E.2d 364, 367 (S.C. 1994) (holding
that breach not material where lessee failed to pay increase in rent due to honest
misunderstanding and immediately attempted to cure when notified, in part due
to good faith oflessee).
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It is, of course, impossible to predict whether a change in the

application of legal doctrine will effect a change in human behav
ior. Even if this modification does not alter such behavior, it will at
least clarify the law and provide courts and parties with a better
understanding of how to make determinations of material breach.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Under current law, the doctrine of material breach is applied
by the courts in a muddled, unfocused way. The courts do not gen
erally explain the basis of their decisions, nor do they provide any
clear application of the Second Restatement factors for deterrrlin
ing material breach. As a result, the decisions often seem unrea
soned, and the focus on who breached first leaves parties exposed
to uncertainty and the risk of liability, if they suspend or terminate
performance in response to what they guess is a material breach by
the other party.l44
There is little question that the public interest would be greatly
served if the law clarified the doctrine of material breach. Thus,
when focusing on the "materiality" of a particular failure to per
form, courts should eschew the confused multifactor balancing test
of the Second Restatement and instead focus, as Judge Cardozo
did, on the degree of harm caused by the breach to the reasonable
expectations of the nonbreaching party and on the degree of harm
that the breaching party would experience if the court excused the
other party from performing. 145 This balance of harms should then
be evaluated most carefully in light of the question of good faith.
The courts should focus on the character of the conduct, that is,
the motivation and state of mind of the parties. 146
In contract disputes where the balance of harms is close and
the parties are all operating in good faith, courts should encourage
the parties to resolve their dispute by finding no material breach
and ordering specific performance of the contract. 147 On the other
hand, where the harm to the nonbreaching party significantly out
weighs the risk of harm to the breaching party, or where the
breaching party is acting in bad faith, that breach should be consid144. For a discussion of the facts of the hypothetical, see supra note 132 and
accompanying text.
145. See generally Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 889 (highlighting Judge Car
dozo's views).
146. See Rosett, supra note 1, at 1086 (discussing that traditional legal theories
focus on who breached first).
147. See Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together, supra note 26, at 560 (discussing
that expectations of parties is best way to resolve problems of breach).
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ered material and the nonbreaching party should be fully compen
sated based on its expectation interest. 148 If both parties are acting
in bad faith, then no material breach should be found, and both
parties should be denied the benefits of the contract. 149
By providing a more focused framework for determining mate
rial breach and by structuring contract law remedies to deter bad
faith breaches, the law may more successfully promote good faith
contract performance and independent resolution of contract dis
putes. At the very least, it will promote a better understanding of
the law by parties and more honest and lucid decision-making by
the courts.
148. For a discussion of specific performance and its role in material breach,
see supra note 134 and accompanying text.
149. For a discussion of the notion of deterring willful breaches, see supra
note 134 and accompanying text.
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